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Financial Intermediation, Heterogeneous Investors, and Asset Pricing
Jaehyun Cho
This dissertation consists of three essays in financial intermediation, heterogeneous agents, and
asset pricing. In the first essay, I extract mutual fund flows that respond to the active change in
equity share of mutual funds and show that they have significant predictability of market return.
These “market timing-sensitive (MT-sensitive) flows” have predictability of the overall market over
the next two to twelve months, without evidence of reversal. This predictability holds even when
controlling for other macroeconomic variables and market sentiment index. I report that mutual
fund managers who enjoy MT-sensitive inflows outperform the managers with MT-sensitive outflows
over the next quarter. Also, I show that investors whose mutual fund investments mimic MT-
sensitive flows have market timing ability, and outperform investors with mutual fund investments
in the opposite direction to MT-sensitive flows.
In the second essay, I analyze mutual fund investors’ responses to changes in funds’ allocations
to emerging markets. I show that such flows predict positive abnormal returns in emerging markets
at quarterly and annual horizons. When there is one standard deviation shock to the EMT-sensitive
flows, a six-month equal-weighted emerging market return is expected to be 3.58% in excess of risk-
free rate in the US, and 1.69% in excess of US stock market excess return. This predictability holds
even when controlling for other macroeconomic variables. The evidence suggests fund investors
collectively possess valuable information about emerging markets.
The third essay proposes a general equilibrium model with bounded rationality that explains
both endogenous learning and price. If agents are bounded rational, in that they do not have com-
plete processing capacity as assumed in rational expectations models, there is a role for endogenous
allocation of resources to learning about the economy. Investors trade off learning about different
elements, such as terminal dividend (asset fundamental) vs. market structure (aggregate demand
schedules). I found that investors prefer to learn what others do not learn, and this explains why
there is specialization in the investment. Investors tend to be fundamentalists when market is
uncertain, but learning also depends on capacity, ratio of sophisticated investors, risk aversion, etc.
I analyze the trade-off between these information sources, and the implications for price efficiency,
risk, and return, in a general equilibrium.
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Chapter I
Return Predictability from Market
Timing-Sensitive Mutual Fund Flows
1 Introduction
This research shows that mutual fund flows that respond to the market timing of mutual funds,
which I refer to as “market timing-sensitive (MT-sensitive) flows,” predict the future market. For
each month, I extract the difference in investors’ aggregate response to the mutual funds based on
their most recent quarterly equity share change. When the flows to the funds with equity share
increases are greater than the flows to the funds with equity share decreases, the market return is
expected to be positive over the next two to twelve months, without evidence of reversal. When the
MT-sensitive flow is one standard deviation above the mean, the return increases by 1.78 percent,
on average, over the next 3 months. I find that the results remain significant after controlling for
dividend yields, term spreads, or other macro variables known to predict the market. Predictability
remains significant in subsamples consisting of the first and second halves of the time period.
I show that the predictability comes from domestic equity mutual funds and hybrid funds. By
using the various codes reported in CRSP mutual fund database with the active share measure in
Petajisto (2013) to distinguish closet-index funds from active investing funds, I investigate what
types of funds are the source of predictability. There is no predictability of market return from
MT-sensitive flows to passive, or international mutual funds. This is consistent with the hypothesis
that predictability comes from the investors who evaluate active mutual fund managers’ skills.
I further show that MT-sensitive flows follow the fund managers with skill to generate positive
benchmark-adjusted and risk-adjusted return.
My flow-based return predictor is distinct from other studies that examine the effect of fund
flows on subsequent market returns in several ways. First, greater MT-sensitive fund flows predict
higher market return, suggesting that these flows follow the managers with future outperformance.
Second, this return predictability is not followed by reversal. These two results give an indication
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that the predictability may not come from pricing pressure or sentiment that have been the sources
of the predictability of market return from mutual fund flows in previous studies. This predictability
remains significant even after controlling for other fund flow-related measures known to predict the
market, such as the market sentiment index in Baker and Wurgler (2007) and the exchange between
bond and equity funds in Ben-Rephael, Kandel, and Wohl (2012).
The positive correlation MT-sensitive flows and future market return supports the existence
of sophisticated mutual fund investors in the market. Mutual fund flows, on average, have been
considered to proxy for investor sentiments. Teo and Woo (2004) and Frazzini and Lamont (2008)
show the “dumb money” effect where investors’ reallocation of wealth across different mutual funds
reduce their wealth on average. However, Del Guercio and Reuter (2014) show that there are
different market segments such as the broker-sold segment and the direct-sold segment, and that
the funds in the direct-sold segment do not underperform index funds. Berk and Van Binsbergen
(2014) introduce a size-adjusted skill measure, and provide evidence that rational investors co-
exist with mutual fund managers who have skills to generate positive alpha compared to other
alternative passive funds. The results from these two studies suggest the existence of fund flows
from sophisticated investors who have information about the fund manager’s skill.
I give evidence that institutional funds have an important role in this market return predictabil-
ity. Institutional accounts in mutual funds, which include accounts purchased by an institution,
such as a business, financial, or nonprofit organization, constitute 650 billion dollars and 13.40% of
overall mutual fund investments in year 2014 (Investment Company Institute (2015)). However, if
we consider the overall AUM of institutional funds which include primary accounts of individuals
issued by a broker-dealer and mutual fund holdings of other mutual funds which are excluded from
this statistics, their total net asset size increases more. I show that insitutional funds are the main
source of predictability from MT-sensitive flows over the stock market. By decomposing mutual
fund flows into retail flows and institutional flows, I show that institutional MT-sensitive flows are
the ones who provide predictability over the market. This is consistent with studies on different
shares of mutual funds such as Evans and Fahlenbrach (2012), suggesting that institutional mutual
fund investors show higher level of sophistication. In addition, I show that the mutual funds with
institutional shares actually provide positive alpha to their institutional investors. However, this
result does not deny the existence of sophisticated retail mutual fund investors in the market.
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I report the significant level of skill of mutual fund managers who enjoy “MT-sensitive inflows.”
A mutual fund’s market timing translates to not only a one-time but, on average, a persistent
outperformance in the future. Bollen and Busse (2005) show significant outperformance of mutual
funds that showed market timing skills during the prior quarter, which justifies sophisticated in-
vestors’ investment in those funds. I find that funds with MT-sensitive inflows outperform those
with MT-sensitive outflows with persistent market timing skills over the next quarter. The former
yields a significantly higher alpha compared to the latter when three main Vanguard index funds are
used as the relevant opportunity set for passive investments, or when Carhart’s four-factor model
is used to measure their performance. Specifically, the former produces a positive alpha of 11 bps
when its performance is compared to Vanguard index funds. These results support the existence
of sophisticated mutual fund investors who choose mutual funds as their tool to outperform other
alternative investments such as passive index funds.
Additionally, on the investors’ side, using retail trading data from Barber and Odean (2000), I
test whether investors whose mutual fund choices are aligned with MT-sensitive flows are indeed
relatively more sophisticated in their other investments compared to other mutual fund investors.
I first select investors with similar mutual fund choices as the MT-sensitive flows and test whether
their aggregate stock (non-fund) investments outperform those of other mutual fund investors. I
find that their stock portfolios significantly outperform other mutual fund investors’ stock portfolios,
suggesting that they are better investors. Furthermore, their outperformances are mostly due to
their market timing, rather than stock picking. This is indicative evidence that these investors have
information about the future market.
I focus on market timing of fund managers, rather than stock picking, in this research. Several
studies point to the importance of market timing in assessing the skill of mutual fund managers.
The cross-sectional dispersion of market timing skills of mutual funds provides a rationale for
sophisticated investors to consider the market timing ability of mutual funds as an important
factor on their fund choices. Assuming continuous trading with no transaction costs, Jiang, Yao,
and Yu (2007) show that market timing difference between fund managers at the 25th and 75th
percentiles of market timing skill yields a return difference of approximately 4.05%/year1. Though
1Jiang et al. (2007) run a regression of a fund’s holding beta on future market return, and the coefficient on future
market return represents the market timing skill of the fund. The percentile ranks of coefficients from the regression
for each fund show the average market timing distribution of funds over time. The distribution of market timing
3
this excess return is estimated with continuous market timing, which is unlikely given trading cost
and frictions, it suggests that the market timing of mutual fund managers can be an important
factor for sophisticated investors.
One possible counter-argument may be why investors with valuable information do not invest
directly on their own to exploit their information and choose the less efficient way – i.e., mutual
funds. First, institutional accounts in mutual funds give the lower cost than retail accounts in
mutual funds and therefore , and Second, my rationale can be supported by two arguments on
retail investors: 1) retail investors might not have enough resources to track down the market
consistently, and 2) retail investors may believe that there exist skilled fund managers who have
more accurate information, and they will use their current information about the market to identify
who are actually skilled. The outperformance of the funds with MT-sensitive inflows when compared
to various alternative investments supports this idea. This is reported in Section 4.1.
Furthermore, there are specific reasons why I assume that investors respond to equity share
information of mutual funds. The Securities and Exchange Commission strongly recommends that
mutual funds provide information on asset allocation across different asset classes as a tabular or
graphic presentation to allow investors to fully understand their investment nature2. As a result,
equity share of a mutual fund can be considered as one of the most accessible information about
the fund. Therefore, I built a proxy for fund managers’ market views that investors respond to,
using their equity share change.
Also, it should be noted that information on asset allocation is not the only source through
which investors can gather information on the fund managers’ views . For instance, fund managers
frequently comment on the market via their prospecti or investor meetings where investors can
observe their views on the market. The fund managers’ views reported through these channels
will also be correlated with their equity share change. If this correlation is high enough, the
implication from the assumption that investors respond to equity share of mutual funds is same as
the assumption that investors respond to the market view of fund managers.
There are several reasons why the equity share change, not the level, is more relevant in iden-
skill in Jiang et al. (2007) is a realized one, and not a predictive one. Therefore, to earn 4.05%/year from the market
timing of fund managers, an investor needs more information about either the market timing skill of fund managers
or the future market return.
2http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8393.htm#IIB4, Section II.B.3.
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tifying sophsticated investors’ flows. First, fund flows based on investment change are much less
correlated with false signals such as past performances or fund types that have high correlation
with the equity share level. Second, when mutual fund investment responds to the expected return
of mutual funds, the difference between capital inflows and outflows depends on the change in ex-
pected returns, which are highly correlated with the investment change. Therefore, by aggregating
fund flows based on equity share change, I build MT-sensitive flows that decrease the effect from
false signals and extract the flows that respond to expected mutual fund returns. I show that these
false signals have limited effect on MT-sensitive flows in Section 3.3.1.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the mutual fund data and house-
hold trading data used in this paper. Section 3 shows the predictability of market return from
MT-sensitive flows. Section 4 provides evidence for the sophistication of mutual fund investors
responsible for MT-sensitive flows, and the skill of mutual fund managers who enjoy MT-sensitive
fund inflows.
2 Data Description
2.1 Mutual Fund Database
I use the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free US Mutual Fund database for fund flows, returns, sizes, and
fund characteristics such as investment types and management fees. I merge different share classes
in one fund by using MFlinks, as in Lou (2012). I obtain quarterly mutual fund holdings data from
the Thomson Reuters Ownership Data (formerly known as CDA/Spectrum Mutual Fund database)
for the period of 1991 to 2013, which is also linked from CRSP database by MFlinks. While most
mutual funds file their reports at the end of a quarter, the date on which the holdings are valid
(report date) is often different from the filing date. I assume that the most recent information on
fund holding available to investors are from the most recent filing of the fund to SEC. Therefore,
the funds can be categorized by their recent investment change reported on each filing date. Nearly
all filing dates are the quarter-end dates, with the exception of less than 1.2% of the sample. Also, I
only consider mutual funds that contain any US equity share in their portfolios to focus on mutual
fund investors who are interested in US stock market.
To be consistent with the monthly fund flows data calculated from the CRSP database, I use the
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total net asset value of the funds from CRSP (TNACRSP ), and eliminated the funds with asset val-
ues reported in Thomson Reuters (TNAThomson) within the range of 0.5 < TNAThomson/TNACRSP <
2 to ensure two data sets are consistent3. Furthermore, I exclude the funds with equity holding
higher than 200% of total net asset or negative equity holding to avoid holding data errors. Also,
regarding the passive and active change in US equity share which are more clearly described in the
next section, I exclude the extreme passive and active holding changes that are more than 100% of
the past total net asset to avoid specific holding data errors.
Linking the CRSP database to the Thomson Reuters database allows 217,755 fund-quarter
(or semi-annual, annual) observations of fund holdings, with 6,978 mutual funds available in the
dataset. I exclude the fund observations that have different share classes filing their holdings on
different filing dates to clarify the information release time to the market. Also, using this dataset
to categorize the funds with the most recent equity share change, I obtain 1,052,782 fund-month
observations on fund flows. I excluded funds that have zero U.S. equity market share, and also
eliminated fund flow observations that are more than 6 months after the most recent holding report.
I remove the fund whose size is less than 10 million dollars to 1) further insure the data quality,
and 2) to avoid that the large fund flows at the beginning stage of the fund may bias the result on
fund flow response to past performances I estimate. Also, I exclude the samples with the fund flow
ratio that is higher than 1000% or lower than -150% to avoid the extreme flows from the beginning
period of funds or samples with data error. I also remove the current monthly flow level is higher
than its current asset under management (AUM) to avoid the funds with negative AUM. I also
use the funds with their investments in which more than 20 firms in their portfoilo, and maximum
equity share of each firm does not exceed 20% of AUM to avoid pure stock picking funds. As a
result, 579,310 fund-month observations are left with 150,121 fund-quarter holding observations
from 6,129 mutual funds.
Fund flows to mutual fund i during the month t, FFi, t is defined as follows where TNAi, t is the
net asset value of the fund i at the end of month t, Reti, t is the return from the fund i’s investment
during the month t, and MGNi, t is the fund flow from mergers and acquisitions with other funds.
Mergers and acquisitions information is also available from CRSP.
3This is consistent with Lou (2012).
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FFi, t = TNAi, t − TNAi, t−1 · (1 +Reti, t)−MGNi, t
Other relevant stock returns and adjustment factors to the number of shares reported in the
Thomson Reuters database are from the CRSP monthly stock data. Dividend yield is calculated
from CRSP value-weighted portfolio, and term spreads and default spreads are from the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Aggregate equity fund flow data is from Investment Company Institute
(ICI), and the exchange flow data from bond funds to equity funds is from the online appendix of
Ben-Rephael et al. (2012).
2.2 Household Position Data
I use the household position data from Barber and Odean (2000) to analyze the trading behavior
of rational and irrational mutual fund investors. The details of this data are provided in Barber
and Odean (2000). The demographic information of retail investors in this data 8 is explained in
Barber and Odean (2001), and mutual fund investment data is explained in Barber, Odean, and
Zheng (2005). The households’ position data is extracted from the trades of 78,000 households,
covering 2,363,417 mutual fund positions and 14,731,172 stock (non-fund) holding is explained in
Barber and Odean (2000), Barber and Odean (2001), and mutual fund investment data is explained
in Barber et al. (2005).
The households’ position data is extracted from the trades of 78,000 households, covering
2,363,417 mutual fund positions and 14,731,172 stock (non-fund) holding positions whose CRSP
data is also available. There are 2,916,021 household-month observations from 66,291 households
with at least one stock (non-fund) position at the month-end. Also, there are 853,434 household-
month observations from 25,331 households with at least one mutual fund position at the month-
end. The data spans from January 1991 to December 19964.
4There also exist trading data from Barber and Odean (2000). The trading data contains 1,965,496 stock trades
from 63,151 households and 358,388 mutual fund trades from 27,321 households. However, I used monthly position
data since 1) its frequency matches the MT-sensitive flows I used to categorize investors, and 2) I compare the
aggregate performance of all stocks held by investors in each category, not only the performance from trading avtivities.
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3 Mutual Fund Flows and Market Returns
In this section, I test the hypothesis that MT-sensitive flows based on the equity share change
reflect the information that sophisticated investors have about the market. I first report the quar-
terly equity share changes of mutual funds to discuss how actively each mutual fund is involved in
market timing. Then, I test whether the MT-sensitive flows predict the future market return. Fur-
thermore, I investigate the source of this predictability to elucidate the rationale for MT-sensitive
flows by examining the types of funds and the types of firms in the funds’ portfolios. I test whether
the predictability comes from specific types of funds, or whether the predictability is concentrated
on specific types of firms in the market for which sophisticated investors might have informational
advantage.
3.1 Active Equity Trading of Mutual Funds
The summary statistics of mutual fund holdings for each fund type from 1991 to 2013 are in Ta-
ble 1. International funds are defined by the various fund style codes in CRSP and CDA/Spectrum.
Domestic equity funds are defined as the funds 1) that have CRSP and CDA/Spectrum codes re-
ported as domestic funds, 2) whose equity holdings are at least 60% of equity share, and 3) whose
shares of domestic equities are more than 70% on average. If a fund has a code that classifies it as
a non-equity or international fund for any of the four specified codes (CRSP, Wiesenburger, SI, and
Lipper), then it is categorized as non-equity or international funds. In addition, I use a keyword
search on fund names to specify their investment styles. When a fund has a name that specifies
countries, continents, or geographical regions, it is categorized as an international fund. Hybrid
funds are the funds that are reported as domestic funds by their codes, but that are not categorized
as domestic equity funds. Passive funds are funds that report themselves as index funds, or have
some “keywords” in their name that indicate they are index funds, in their name (See Appendix
A). If they do not have any codes data, they are categorized as “Other” funds and are not reported
in this table (14,487 fund-qtr observations).
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Table 1 Equity Share Change of Mutual Funds That Report Equity Holdings to SEC
The statistics reported in Table 1 are the average values of the estimates from each quarter. The
categorization of funds is based on the style codes from the CRSP Mutual Fund Database, and
on the key word search on fund names. The percentage of Total observations is the percentage of
fund-quarter observations in each category. US equity share is the median percentage of US equity
shares in the funds’ holdings in each category. (∆ES, qtr)a−b and (∆ESactive, qtr)a−b notate the
equity share change (active change in equity share) difference in the last quarter between a%
quartile and b% quartile, showing how dispersed mutual funds’ investments on US equity are in
each category. The active change in equity share is defined as the equity share change except the
change that comes from constituent stock price changes. The market timing measure is the active
beta change multiplied by the next quarter’s return.
Passive Funds Active Funds
US E Hybrid International US E Hybrid International
Net Assets($ mil) 2632.04 1272.50 1391.14 1087.90 968.34 1001.28
% of Tot. Observations 3.61% 3.50% 1.92% 50.50% 21.09% 19.38%
US Equity Share (median) 97.47% 1.02% 41.33% 89.08% 57.90% 35.58%
(∆ES, qtr)75−25 2.73% 0.69% 1.22% 5.16% 5.74% 4.66%
(∆ESactive, qtr)75−25 3.60% 0.81% 1.58% 6.85% 6.88% 5.42%
(∆ESactive, qtr)90−10 9.59% 3.77% 5.59% 16.31% 16.80% 13.82%
Std. Dev. of Market Timing(Qtr) 0.46% 0.27% 0.36% 0.78% 0.78% 0.67%
# of Fund-Qtr 4173 4049 2218 58348 24362 22391
I report the cross-sectional distribution of equity share change for each fund type. (∆ES, qtr)a−b
and (∆ESactive, qtr)a−b notate the equity share change (active change in equity share) difference
in the prior quarter between a% quartile and b% quartile, showing how dispersed mutual funds’
equity share changes are in each category. The active change in equity share is defined as the equity
share change except the change that comes from constituent stock price changes, which is defined
in Section 3.2.2 in detail. Active beta change in Table 1 is defined similarly, as the beta change
except the change that comes from constituent stock price and beta changes.
The cross-sectional distribution of equity share change in Table 1 suggests that two domestic
equity funds might have a return difference, which is their active change difference of equity share
multiplied by the future market return. For example, when one is at the 10th percentile and the
other is at the 90th percentile of equity share change, the equity share change difference between
these two funds is, on average, 16.31%. This implies that since the standard deviation of market
return per quarter since year 1991 is 8.56%, the return difference from their equity share change
over the next quarter is about 1.40% when the market return over the next quarter has one standard
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deviation above its mean.
Since MFlinks data is concentrated on domestic equity funds, about 64.35% of the entire sample
has equity share between 60% and 100%. However, their equity share is volatile over time. For
example, the standard deviation of active change in equity share within eight consecutive quarters
is 2.41%, 4.23%, and 7.44% of total net assets at 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiile, respectively. The
active fund’s beta change has cutoffs at 0.03, 0.06, and 0.10 at 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiile. This
implies that from the standard deviation of market return per quarter as 8.56%, the return deviation
of the upper 25% of mutual funds from their beta change is about 86 bps per quarter. Though
neither investors, nor fund managers, can fully predict the market return, this return deviation
suggests that a fund manager’s equity share change can be an important factor in investors choosing
the funds.
3.2 How to Construct MT-sensitive Flows
To measure the fund manager’s market timing activities, equity share change might be a more
intuitive measure than beta change since 1) the beta estimation may contain errors, and 2) most
mutual funds report their asset allocation data but not their beta. However, investors might still
use the fund’s beta change instead for two reasons; 1) the fund’s beta is more directly linked to
their expected return, and 2) some funds may have a benchmark beta higher than one, which is
difficult to replicate only with simple index funds. Therefore, in this section, I build MT-sensitive
flows based on both equity share changes and fund beta changes. The flows based on equity share
changes and fund beta changes are highly correlated to each other and indeed show the same
predictability of the future market.
3.2.1 Beta Estimation of Firms in Mutual Fund Holdings
Earliest examples of market timing tests in Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and Henriksson and
Merton (1981) analyzed whether funds actually time the market with market beta, in a CAPM
setting. Since using the return-based beta introduces “artificial timing” bias from the nonlinear
relationship between the return and fund’s beta (Goetzmann, Ingersoll Jr, and Ivković (2000)),
past market timing literatures such as Jiang et al. (2007) and Breon-Drish and Sagi (2011) used
holding-based beta to test the market timing skill of fund managers. For the same reason, in this
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research, I use the holding-based beta which is the weighted average value of each individual firm’s
beta to avoid noise in beta estimation from historical return data with low-frequency. Holding
information is available to investors in the market after the filing date to SEC. Therefore, investors’
reaction to the fund manager’s portfolio choice is implied in the MT-sensitive fund flows.
In calculating the daily beta of firms, I use the methods in Scholes and Williams (1977) to
consider nonsynchronous trading on individual firms, over a time window of the last 252 trading





































where Ri,t, Rm,t, and R
3
m,t are the firm i’s return, the market return, and the 3-day moving average





. The summation is over the dates when the firm i’s stocks were traded. The
data for Scholes and Williams beta are obtained from Eventus, an event study software for financial
research, which is available in WRDS.
For the firms which have less than 60 days of return data available within the time window,
I use the market beta of one. This procedure is consistent with Jiang et al. (2007). I calculate a
fund’s portfolio weight on each stock based on the fund’s report date, and I assume this is a proxy
for the latest information available to sophisticated investors5. As Lou (2012) assumed that a fund
makes no change to its portfolio until the end date of the quarter (filing date), I assume investors
consider the holding portfolio on the report date to be same as the holding portfolio on the filing
date. I obtained the fund’s holding beta using the weighted average of each firm’s beta.
5In accordance with Investment Company Act Rule 30(e), the maximum allowed delay in filing is 60 days after
the report date. Therefore, when the filing date in Thomson Reuters is less than 60 days after the report date, the
holdings may not be public information on the quarter-end date that Thomson Reuters uses as the filing date. With
the assumption that investors react to the information with a >60 day gap after the Thomson Reuter filing date, the
predictability of future market return reported in Section 3.3.1 remains similar, and this result is reported in Table
3.
Also, Thomson Reuters is one of several potential channels that sophisticated investors may use to learn about
mutual fund managers’ market timing activities, i.e. equity share changes in their portfolio. Morningstar Mutual
Fund Database receives holding information directly from most funds and reduces the time delay for the information
to be public. Fund managers can also communicate with investors about their market outlook via media, or direct
letters and reports to investors. Therefore, I use the equity share change in the most recent quarter as the proxy for
the latest information available to sophisticated investors.
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3.2.2 Active Change in Funds’ Equity Holdings and Beta
I can decompose the equity holding change into two parts: passive change and active change.
Passive change results from the price change of the shares held. For example, if the equity market
goes up, a fund’s equity holding increases without changing the portfolio actively. I focus only on
the active change in fund managers since this change reflects the manager’s beliefs on the market.
Let’s define EHit as the equity holding of the fund i at time t, TNAi,t as the total net asset of
the fund i at time t, N jit as the number of the firm i’s shares held at time t, and Pjt as the price
of each share at time t. If I assume that a fund manager maintains the portfolio weight on each
stock when there is no change in his beliefs, equity holding change (∆EHit) of a mutual fund can




































where reti,t is the fund i’s return from equity holdings from time t − 1 to time t. Since the price-
driven change does not reflect the manager’s beliefs on the market, I only consider the changes in
equity share from active management between time t− 1 and t.
For active beta change of mutual funds, passive change results from both the price change and
the beta change of the shares held. Active beta change of mutual funds is similarly defined as the
overall beta change less the passive change. The beta change (∆βHit) is decomposed into active
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where βst is the beta of the firm s at time t and ∆βst = βst− βst−1, with the other notations same
as above.
3.2.3 How to Construct MT-sensitive Flows
I categorize the funds based on their last quarterly equity share change into quartiles. I1 denotes
the top quartile, a group of mutual funds with the greatest equity share increases, and I2 denotes
the bottom quartile, a group of mutual funds with the greatest equity share decreases. MT-sensitive









where FFi, t is fund flows to mutual fund i during the month t, and MFIt−1 is the aggregate
mutual fund industry size at month t− 1. For each month, I subtract the aggregate fund flows to
I2 from the aggregate fund flows to I1 to extract the difference in investors’ aggregate response to
each group, and I normalize it with the lagged aggregate asset under management in overall mutual
fund industry. When this measure is positive, investors respond positively to the increase in equity
share change of mutual funds, and vice versa.
Figure 1 illustrates the chronological order of equity share changes, fund flows (MT-sensitive
flows), and the future market return. I categorize mutual funds into I1 and I2 based on the most
recently available quarterly equity holding change. Then I aggregate the mutual fund flows to build
the fund flow difference measure at month t. I use this measure to test the predictability of market
return after month t, over two to twelve months.
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Figure 1. The Time Window of Mutual Fund Equity Investment, Fund Flow, and Future Market
Return
3.2.4 MT-sensitive Flows Modified for False Signals
Fund characteristics such as fund styles, fund past performances, or fund equity share levels
might work as false signals to unsophisticated mutual fund investors. Barberis and Shleifer (2003)
build a model to explain how some agents irrationaly respond to the styles of assets, and Teo and
Woo (2004) shows how mutual fund flows that respond to the styles of funds can affect asset prices.
Investors respond to past performances (Ippolito (1992), Sirri and Tufano (1998)). However, per-
sistence in performances is largely attributed to the momentum effects (Carhart (1997)), and there
is little evidence on that past performances predict future performances when the performances
are correctly adjusted by the appropriate risk factors or benchmarks. Fund equity share levels,
co-varying with their styles and past performances, is also related to the false signals that investors
respond to.
The top and the bottom quartile based on the most recently available quarterly equity holding
change, I1 and I2, might consist of funds with different equity share levels on average or different
fund styles such that there are different levels of fund flows to I1 and I2 that respond to false
signals. To address this problem, I double sort the mutual funds based on these signals and their
equity share change so that in each quartile there is similar distribution of these false signals. I will
denote the MT-sensitive flows from the double-sorting as the modified MT-sensitive flows. They
have less aggregate effect from the fund flows that respond to these signals.
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For example, to categorize the fund styles, I use the CDA/Spectrum mutual fund investment
codes. Within the subset of mutual funds with the same style, I categorize the funds into quartiles
based on their equity share change and define I1 as the union of top quartiles from each subset, and
I2 as the union of bottom quartiles from each subset. To account for the fund flows responding to
the other two characteristics, i.e., past performances and past equity share levels, I first categorize
the funds into quartile based on past performances and past equity share levels, respectively. Then,
within each quartile, I categorize them based on the last quarterly equity share level change into
quartiles. I1, again, is the union of top quartiles from each subset, and I2 is the union of bottom
quartiles from each subset.
I report the correlation between these modified MT-sensitive flows, which are robust to fund
characteristics, and the original MT-sensitive flows in Section 3.3.1, and also compare their pre-
dictability of market return. If prior equity share change has a weak correlation with false signals
such as past performances or fund styles, the correlation between the original and modified MT-
sensitive flows will be high, and the two flows will have similar predictability of market return.
3.3 Predictability from Mutual Fund Flows
3.3.1 Predictability of the Market Return
MT-sensitive flows predict the future market return such that these flows follow fund managers
who changed their equity share in the right direction before the market movements. To test the
predictability, I run the following regression:
remt+k, t+k+l = α+ β ·MTft + γ′ · FFlowt + δ′ · Controlt + εit+k,t+l
remt+k, t+k+l is the market excess return between month t + k and month t + k + l. MTft is
MT-sensitive flows at month t, and FFlowt is other fund flow measures at month t that are known
to predict stock market returns. Controlt includes macroeconomic variables that predict stock
market returns.
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Table 2 Predictability of the Market Return from MT-sensitive Flows Based on Recent Equity
Holding Change
Table 2 reports the predictability of the market return from MT-sensitive flows. MTf t is
MT-sensitive flow divided by the total net asset value of mutual funds in the market. Panel A
report the predictability when no fund characteristics are controlled. eqflowt is the aggregate
fund flow to equity funds divided by the total net asset value of mutual funds. eqbondt, from
Ben-Rephael et al. (2012), is the exchange from bond funds to equity funds less exchanges from
equity funds to bond funds, divided by the total net asset value of mutual funds. divt is the
dividend yield of CRSP value-weighted portfolio during the previous one year, and termt is the
difference between the 10-year Treasury bond yield and the 3-month T-bill rate. remt,t+k is the
market excess return from the end of month t to the end of month t + k. The samples are from
April 1991 to December 2013.
Flows Control
A MTf t eqflowt eqbondt divt termt R2 Obs.
remt,t+3 1.78*** 0.04 260
(3.65)
remt,t+3 1.83*** 0.52 -0.72 0.05 260
(3.21) (0.42) (-1.05)
remt,t+3 1.69*** 0.29 -0.72 1.50* -0.34 0.08 260
(2.83) (0.21) (-0.95) (1.73) (-0.40)
remt,t+3 1.69*** 1.44* -0.42 0.08 260
(3.42) (1.88) (-0.53)
remt+1,t+4 1.80*** 1.63** -0.52 0.08 260
(3.88) (2.03) (-0.64)
remt+3,t+12 1.95** 4.32* 1.23 0.14 258
(2.60) (1.93) (0.64)
remt+13,t+24 -0.48 3.33 7.39**
(-0.49) (1.11) (2.27)
This result is summarized in Table 26. The predictability is concentrated in the next 2-12
months7, and there is no evidence of reversal after twelve months. The pricing pressure from fund
flows might mitigate the predictability of the next month’s return. The predictability remains
significant in the subsamples consisting of the first and second halves of the time period. The
predictibility also remains significant after I control for macroeconomic variables such as dividend
yield or term spread between short-term and long-term treasury bonds. The predictability remains
after 1% winsorization of the fund flow measure, which shows that the predictability is not a result
6The predictability from MT-sensitive flows that respond to equity share changes during the quarter preceding
the previous quarter is reported in Table 3. Market predictability remains even under the assumption that investors
react to the information with a >60 day gap after the Thomson Reuter filing date.
7Though the predictability of the next 3-12 month returns are only reported in Table 2, the predictability is
significant for the market return in the next 2-12 months.
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Table 3 Predictability of the Market Return from MT-sensitive Flows Based on Recent Equity
Holding Change Considering Holding Disclosure Delays
Table 3 reports the predictability of the market return from MT-sensitive flows that respond to
the equity share changes of mutual funds that are public to investors through SEC. Therefore,
the funds are categorized into quartiles based on their equity share change during the quarter
preceding the previous quarter. Other notations are same as Table 2.
Flows Control
A MTf t eqflowt eqbondt divt termt R2 Obs.
remt,t+1 0.99*** 0.05 257
(4.59)
remt,t+1 0.98*** 0.91 -0.62 0.05 257
(4.35) (1.00) (-1.72)
remt,t+1 0.99*** 0.78 -0.64 0.58* -0.11 0.06 257
(4.30) (0.78) (-1.61) (1.65) (-0.40)
remt,t+3 1.76*** 1.99** -0.39 0.08 257
(2.70) (2.15) (-0.51)
remt,t+6 2.51*** 4.39** -0.58 0.12 257
(3.27) (2.37) (-0.40)
remt,t+9 3.10*** 6.15** 0.03 0.16 257
(3.12) (2.35) (0.02)
of a few outliers. The direction of the predictability is consistent in the first and second halves of
the time period. R2 seems relatively low in contrast with the t-statistics of regression coefficients,
though low R2 is common in predictability regression on monthly returns (Campbell and Thompson
(2008)).
The last column shows that there is no evidence of long-run reversal from this predictability.
When I do not include other macroeconomic variables for this regression, the estimated coefficient
for MT-sensitive flows was even positive. Also, though I did not report in this table, I controlled
lagged aggregate equity flows and lagged exchange between bond and equity funds to test whether
the predictability might come from persistence of capital flows to equity funds. However, the
predictability result was robust after including them in the regression. This result is robust to
various filtering criteria I used for fund sample selection as well; for instance, when I impose the
sample fund selection of minimum 10% U.S. equities in its holding, the result still remains similar.
Though MT-sensitive flows are normalized by the aggregate mutual fund industry size, pre-
dictability remains even when the measure is normalized by the other variables such as number of
mutual funds in the market, or the overall stock market capitalization from the last month. Both
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cases are rejected by the Dickey-Fuller test, which suggests the flow measure is stationary. Addition-
ally, although unreported here, the predictability remains when MT-sensitive flows are winsorized
by 1 percent to ensure that a small number of observations derive the predictability from the en-
tire sample. Since the predictability cannot be explained by public macroeconomic variables also
known to predict the market, investors’ information can be interpreted as their private information
or better interpretation skills from public news compared to other investors.
When MT-sensitive flow is one standard deviation above its mean, 1.6% excess future market
return is expected over the next 3-month window. The standard deviation of MT-sensitive flows is
0.06% of the total assets under management in the mutual fund industry. Using the predictability
from MT-sensitive flows, the optimal strategy8 that maximizes the Sharpe ratio by changing the
weight on market portfolio, which uses the estimate from the samples before the end of year 2002,
yields ex-post Sharpe ratio 0.75 since year 2003 while the market portfolio has its Sharpe ratio 0.28.
The predictability from MT-sensitive flows which are measured based on fund beta changes is
reported in Table 4. These flows have high correlation (0.9) with the flows based on fund equity
share changes, and both flows have similar predictability of future market return. The fund’s equity
share change is highly correlated with its beta change, and therefore, when investors respond to the
asset allocation data of mutual funds in their fund reports, they are also responding to the beta
change of funds.
I compare MT-sensitive flows to modified MT-sensitive flows in Section 3.2.4, and report the
result in Table 5. As shown in Panel A, modified MT-sensitive flows have high correlation 0.92-0.98
after controlling for signals such as fund styles or past performances, which suggests that equity
share change is an appropriate measure with which to control the aggregate effect from these signals.
Panel B reports the predictability of market return from modified MT-sensitive flows. There exists
strong predictability from each of these modified MT-sensitive flows. The results reported in Table
5 suggests that MT-sensitive flows do not respond to false signals that are not related to the future
return of mutual funds. Therefore, the predictability of market return is not caused by these signals.
8When market return is predictable, the optimal weight on market portfolio that maximizes the Sharpe ratio is
proportional to the linear projection of future market return on the predicting variable. I run a regression of next
month’s market return on MT-sensitive flow based on public information (equity share change during the quarter
preceding the previous quarter) from July 1991 to November 2001, and use the linear projection as the weight on the
market portfolio for the next month. When the weight is negative, I use zero instead. When the weight is greater
than one, I use one to assume there is no use of leverage. I then calculate the Sharpe ratio of the market timing
strategy based on MT-sensitive flows, using realized market returns from January 2002 to December 2012.
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Table 4 Predictability of Market Return from MT-sensitive Flow Based on Recent Beta Change
MTfbeta,t, MT-sensitive flow based on beta, is the difference between the average fund flows to
the funds in the lowest active beta change quartile and the average fund flows to the funds in the
highest active beta change quartile, divided by the total net asset value of mutual funds in the
market. Other variables are also defined the same way as in Table 2. All independent variables
are standardized. Newey-West standard deviations with 12 lags are used for t-statistics.
Flows Control
Returns MTfbeta,t eqflowt eqbondt divt termt R
2 Obs.
remt,t+3 1.32*** 0.02 260
(3.05)
remt,t+3 1.35** 0.42 -0.68 0.03 260
(2.55) (0.34) (-0.98)
remt,t+3 1.40** 0.24 -0.73 1.67* -0.32 0.06 260
(2.39) (0.17) (-0.94) (1.80) (-0.34)
remt,t+3 1.39*** 1.60* -0.39 0.06 260
(3.03) (1.93) (-0.45)
remt+1,t+4 1.52*** 1.80** -0.49 0.07 260
(3.53) (2.09) (-0.55)
remt+3,t+12 1.37 4.49** 1.26 0.13 258
(1.53) (1.98) (0.63)
Table 5 Predictability of the Market Return from Modified MT-sensitive Flows
Panel A reports the correlation between the modified MT-sensitive flows and the original MT-
sensitive flows. Modified MT-sensitive flows are defined in Section 3.2.4. MTf is the original
MT-sensitive flow. MTfFT , MTfPP , MTfPE is the modified MT-sensitive flow controlling
for fund types, past performances, and past equity shares, respectively. All MT-sensitive flows
are normalized by the total net asset value of mutual funds. Panel B reports the predictability
of the market return from modified MT-sensitive flows. The other notations are same as in Table 2.
Panel A MTf MTfFT MTfPP MTfPE
MTf 1.00
MTfFT 0.98 1.00
MTfPP 0.98 0.96 1.00
MTfPE 0.92 0.92 0.93 1.00
Panel B Flows Control
Return MTf MTfFT MTfPP MTfPE divt termt R
2 Obs.
remt,t+3 1.69*** 2.51* -0.35 0.08 260
(3.42) (1.88) (-0.53)
remt,t+3 1.57*** 2.58* -0.38 0.08 260
(3.47) (1.93) (-0.56)
remt,t+3 1.81*** 2.48* -0.34 0.08 260
(3.38) (1.86) (-0.52)
remt,t+3 1.59*** 2.54* -0.38 0.08 260
(3.39) (1.89) (-0.56)
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3.3.2 Retail Investors vs. Institutional Investors
It is important to clarify the source of predictability reported in Section 3.3.1. By using the fund
share name analysis and the institutional account codes which are available from year 1998 in the
CRSP Mutual Fund Database, I categorize funds into institutional fund shares and non-institutional
fund shares which are mostly retail funds. Then I build MT-sensitive flows in each category to test
which types of mutual fund investors have sophisticated information about the market. Institutional
funds only target high value investors with low management fees and high minimum investing
requirements. Therefore, investor sophistication level of investors in institutional funds is expected
to be higher than that of retail investors.
In the mutual fund universe from year 1998, institutional funds constitute one-third of mutual
fund universe in CRSP Mutual Fund Database. There are 112,510 fund-year observations for
institutional funds with 225,453 observations for non-institutiinal funds. The average AUM is
479.7 million U.S. dollars for institutional funds, which is not much different from non-institutiinal
funds’ 425.3 million U.S. dollars. In year 2013, institutional funds have overall AUM of 8 trillion
U.S. dollars, which is comparable with non-institutional funds’ 10 trillion U.S. dollars.
Table 6 compares the predictability of retail and institutional MT-sensitive flows on market
return. Long-run market return predictability (over three to six months) comes from institutional
mutual fund investors despite their relatively small mutual fund market share. Though retail MT-
sensitive flows have higher correlation with the original MT-sensitive flows, the predictability comes
mostly from institutional accounts. This result suggests that the existence of rational mutual fund
investors in Gruber (1996) or Berk and Van Binsbergen (2013) might be related to the existence of
institutional investors in mutual funds.
Strong predictability does not completely deny the rationality of retail mutual fund investors.
Retail mutual fund flows have positive short-run predictability on market return over one month,
though their predictability is concentrated in early periods until year 2000 and does not have signifi-
cant predictability on the equity market returns in the recent samples. This suggests that increased
investments from retail investors on mutual funds have decreased rationality in the mutual fund
flows, and also have decreased predictability from these flows over time. Also, since institutional
investors such as pension funds or retirement plans do not withdraw money frequently (Investment
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Company Institute (2006)), their investment does not target short-run market return predictabil-
ity. Since institutional accounts are mostly for long-term investments, institutional MT-sensitive
flows do not explain the market return predictability over the short run. Therefore, the short-run
predictability from original MT-sensitive flows is from the other type of investors, retail investors.
Table 6 Decomposition of Predictability from Fund Flows to Different Investor Types
Panel A tests predictability from MT-sensitive flows measured for each category of funds.
retail − fft is MT-sensitive flows to non-institutional accounts in mutual funds. inst − fft is
MT-sensitive flows to institutional accounts in mutual funds. Panels B reports the correlation
between original MT-sensitive flows and MT-sensitive flows in Panel A. Samples are from March
1998 to December 2013 that matches with the time window in Petajisto (2010). Newey-West
standard deviations with 12 lags are used for t-statistics.
Panel A MT-sensitive Flows
Returns retail fft inst fft divt termt R2
remt,t+1 1.11** 0.22 0.06
(2.32) (0.38)
remt+1,t+3 -0.47 1.60* 0.02
(-0.65) (1.86)
remt,t+6 -0.21 4.33** 0.07
(-0.17) (2.38)
remt,t+6 1.97*** 6.62*** -0.15 0.17
(2.97) (2.60) (-0.09)
remt,t+6 1.91* 5.71** -0.02 0.16
(1.96) (2.10) (-0.01)
Panel B MTft retail fft inst fft
MTft 1.00
retail fft 0.97 1.00
inst fft 0.66 0.67 -0.07
3.3.3 Hybrid Funds and Active Equity Mutual Funds
By using various mutual fund style codes in the CRSP Mutual Fund Database, I categorize the
funds into several groups such as domestic equity funds, dometic hybrid funds, or international funds
to test whether the predictability comes from a specific group of mutual funds. The categorization
is same as in the section 3.1. In addition to this categorization, I use Active Share from Petajisto
(2013) for domestic equity funds to analyze whether the active trading of mutual funds is an
important factor in the predictability from MT-sensitive flows. By categorizing the funds based
on their equity share changes into quartiles within each group, I build the MT-sensitive flows from
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each group.
The domestic active equity funds are defined as the funds that have Active Share, from Petajisto
(2013), greater than 60%. Active Share is the percentage of a fund’s stock holding that differs from
the fund’s benchmark. Petajisto (2013) and Cremers and Petajisto (2009) set the cutoff at an
Active Share of 60% for closet-indexers, which implies that an active managers deviate 60% of
their stock investments from their benchmark portfolio to outperform it. The domestic equity
funds with Active Share less than 60% are categorized as domestic inactive equity funds.
I summarize in Panel A of Table 7 the predictability of the MT-sensitive flows in different types
of mutual funds. There are two main groups of funds that exihibit predictability: hybrid funds and
domestic active equity funds. The predictability is not present in MT-sensitive flows to inactive
equity funds or international mutual funds. This is plausible when 1) investors use hybrid funds
that do not have restrictions on their equity share level and can freely time the market, and 2)
investors follow active mutual fund managers’ market timing skills in the domestic US market. I
will investigate the fund managers’ skills in detail later in Section 4.1, on these two types.
Panel B of Table 7 reports the predictability from the funds with different historical beta
volatility. The source of predictability from funds with different historical beta has an important
implication for investors since funds with high beta‘volatility can be the ones which are consistently
timing the market. The predictability comes from the funds whose last eight-quarter beta volatility
is greater than or equal to 0.05. This result indicates that investors with information want to invest
with fund managers who has changed beta actively, more than other index funds or passive funds.
Panels C and D show the correlation among MT-sensitive flows from different groups of mutual
funds in Panels A and B, respectively. MTft is MT-sensitive flow from the full sample except index
funds, while actfft , hybfft, inactfft, and intfft are MT-sensitive flows from domestic active
equity funds, hybrid funds, domestic inactive equity funds, and international funds, respectively.
MT-sensitive flows from inactive mutual funds that are closet indexing their benchmark in the
market have a negative correlation with the original or other MT-sensitive flows, suggesting that
the active trading of mutual fund managers has an important role in this predictability of market
return from MT-sensitive flows.
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Table 7 Decomposition of Predictability from Fund Flows to Different Types of Mutual Funds
Panel A tests predictability from MT-sensitive flows measured for each category of funds. actfft
is MT-sensitive flows from domestic active equity funds. inactfft is from domestic inactive equity
funds. hybfft and intfft are from hybrid funds, and international funds, relatively. Panel B tests
predictability from MT-sensitive flows measured in high beta volatililty funds (hbetavol) whose
last eight-quarter beta volatility is greater than or equal to 0.05, and MT-sensitive flows in the
funds whose last eight-quarter beta volatility is les sthan 0.05 (lbeta). Panels C and D reports the
correlation between original MT-sensitive flows and MT-sensitive flows in Panel A and Panel B,
respectively. All independent variables are standardized. Samples are from Apr 1991 to December
2009 that matches with the time window in Petajisto (2010). Newey-West standard deviations
with 12 lags are used for t-statistics.
Panel A MT-sensitive Flows





remt,t+3 0.62 1.03** -0.31 0.02
(0.83) (2.12) (-0.57)
remt,t+3 0.35 0.84* -0.33 0.71 0.03
(0.45) (1.67) (-0.61) (0.98)




remt,t+3 1.51*** 0.55 0.03
(3.47) (0.84)
remt+3,t+12 2.52** -2.14 0.03
(4.30) (-1.04)
Panel C MTft actfft balfft inactfft intfft
actfft 0.77 1.00
balfft 0.49 0.25 1.00
inactfft -0.37 -0.40 -0.07 1.00
intfft 0.41 0.36 0.48 -0.12 1.00
Panel D MTft hbetavolt lbetavolt
hbetavolt 0.72 1.00
lbetavolt 0.45 0.04 1.00
3.3.4 Predictable MT-sensitive Flows
In this section, I test whether MT-sensitive flows themselves can be predicted from other macroe-
conomic variables, lagged fund flows, or past fund performances. The predictor for MT-sensitive
flows can provide more detailed explanation of the valuable information in them.
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Table 8 Predictability of Future Risk Factors from MT-sensitive Flows
Table 8 presents the MT-sensitive flows predictability of lagged MT-sensitive flows, past equity
returns, and macroeconomic variables. Since institutional MT-sensitive flows are only available
after year 1998, institutional MT-sensitive flow samples are between year 1998 and year 2013.
Other MT-sensitive flows are available from year 1991. Every regressor in this analysis is
standardized.
Predictors
Flows MTft−1 MTft−2,t−12 mktrft−1 mktrft−2,t−12 divt term R2
MTft 0.36*** -0.17* -0.01 0.01 0.17
Original (3.30) (-1.93) (-0.46) (0.21)
0.07 -0.00 0.00
(0.50) (-0.02)
0.36*** -0.17** -0.01 0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.17
(3.27) (-2.07) (-0.40) (0.51) (0.57) (-0.39)
inst−MTft 0.54*** 0.13** -0.08** -0.03 0.39
Institutional (7.93) (2.33) (-2.75) (-1.37)
0.52*** -0.01 0.16
(3.35) (-0.10)
0.52*** 0.05*** -0.07** -0.01 0.18* -0.00 0.40
(7.81) (0.65) (-2.37) (-0.19) (2.02) (-0.05)
retail −MTft 0.37*** -0.17* 0.06 0.01 0.18
Retail (3.30) (-1.68) (1.53) (1.18)
0.03 0.06 0.01
(0.19) (0.68)
0.37*** -0.19* 0.06* 0.09 0.11 -0.00 0.18
(3.10) (-1.94) (1.62) (0.34) (1.04) (-0.06)
Table 8 summarizes the result on this. First, all the lagged MT-sensitive flows (original, retail,
and institutional) have strong predictability over the current MT-sensitive flow. Past market returns
also have predictability, while the direction is opposite for original and retail MT-sensitive flows
compared to institutional ones. This suggests retail investors are return-chasing - following mutual
funds that increased their equity share when the recent past market goes up, and vice versa.
In contrast, institutional investors do the opposite, suggesting that institutional investors exploit
from return-chasing behavior of retail investors. Except inststitutional MT-sensitive flows, however,
other variables do not have significant predictability over MT-sensitive flows, which is consistent
with that the information from MT-sensitive flows is not explained by other predictors known to
predict the market.
MT-sensitive flows can be predicted from the lagged flows, but only institutional MT-sensitive
flows have positive correlation from long-term lagged flows. This first suggests that institutional
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mutual fund flows are slow-moving capital (institutional accounts, instead of having low costs, have
several restrictions to withdraw or deposit money) and therefore more persistent than retail flows
over time. Secondly, institutional investors use information in macroeconomic variables such as
dividend yields which are slow-moving (Cochrane (2008)). Also, since the investment decision of
institutional investors are focused on longer horizon, especially in the case of retirement funds or
pension funds, their investment depends on dividend yields that are known to predict the market
over a long horizon and therefore the ows are more persistent.
Being consistent with previous sections, retail-sensitive flows are not explained by macroeco-
nomic variables and have lower R-square compared to institutional flows. Therefore, I will access
their investment sophistication not indirectly from using macroeconomic variables but directly from
analyzing retail trading data in Section 4.
3.3.5 Cross-sectional Distribution of Predictability
To identify the mechanism of predictability, I test the predictability of the standard risk factors
considered in the literature. These factors are the returns of different portfolios categorized by the
financial variables of stocks: book-to-market ratio, firm size, market beta, and past performance.
Table 9 summarizes the predictability of the future risk factors in month t + 1 to t + 3 and t + 4
to t+ 12, from MT-sensitive flows at month t. SMB, HML, and MOM factors, which are small-to-
big, high-minus-low, and momentum factors, respectively, are from Kenneth French’s website. The
QMJ, or quality-minus-junk factor, is from Asness, Frazzini, and Pedersen (2014), and the BAB,
or betting-against-beta factor, is from Frazzini and Pedersen (2014).
Cross-sectional distribution of predictability from MT-sensitive flows is not flat. This result sug-
gests that the market return predictability of MT-sensitive flows, which is positive, is concentrated
on firms with specific characteristics. For example, the positive predictability on SMB suggests
that MT-sensitive flows predict small firms more significantly than large firms - which can also
be confirmed with the separate regression on small cap portfolio returns and large cap portfolio
returns on MT-sensitive flows.
MT-sensitive flows strongly predict the future return of low book-to-market firms, small firms,
high beta firms, firms with superior past performance, and firms with bad quality, with statistical
significance. These firms have higher level of uncertainty, which gives informational advantage to
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Table 9 Predictability of Future Risk Factors from MT-sensitive Flows
Table 9 presents the portfolio return predictability of several systemic risk factors from MT-
sensitive flows. Panel A reports the future 3-month returns of them, and Panel B reports the
future 9-month returns of them after three month gap from the month where MT-sensitive flows
are measured. Newey-West standard deviations with 12 lags are used for t-statistics.
Systemic Risk Factors (Dependent)
A (k=0, l=3) SMB HML MOM QMJ BAB Obs.
MTft 1.72*** -1.62*** 1.91*** -1.74* -0.89* 260
(2.93) (-3.57) (2.98) (-1.81) (-1.96)
B (k=3, l=9) SMB HML MOM QMJ BAB Obs.
MTft -0.41 -2.12* 1.55* 0.52 0.35 256
(-0.91) (-1.67) (1.91) (0.48) (0.32)
sophisticated investors. Even if sophisticated investors time the market with their information about
the overall market, their information can be concentrated more on firms with high uncertainty. This
is consistent with Mondria (2010) and Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010) who show that
investors with endogenous learning concentrate their learning on stocks with higher uncertainty to
enjoy the relative advantage they have against other investors.
4 Revisiting Sophisticated Investors and Fund Managers with Skills
In this section, I provide additional support that there exist sophisticated investors who invest
in mutual fund managers with skill. First, I test whether fund managers with MT-sensitive inflows
actually have skills. Second, I test whether fund investors whose mutual fund choices are aligned
with MT-sensitive flows are indeed sophisticated in their trading, on average. These analyses will
also clarify the link between sophisticated investors who drive these fund flows and the mutual
fund investors mentioned in previous studies such as “sophisticated clientele” in Gruber (1996) or
“rational investors” in Berk and Green (2004) and Berk and Van Binsbergen (2013).
4.1 MT-sensitive Flows and Mutual Fund Managers’ Skills
I first test the skill of mutual fund managers who enjoy MT-sensitive flows. Table 10 reports that
fund managers with MT-sensitive fund inflows outperform those with MT-sensitive fund outflows
and show persistent market timing skills over the next quarter. The former is denoted as the
“Right” funds, and the latter is defined as “Wrong” funds. I compare the performances of Right
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Table 10 Market Timers with Superior Fund Managing Skills
MT-sensitive flows are standardized to be determined whether they are inflows or outflows to the
funds in the top quantile based on their prior equity share change. Only domestic active equity
funds and hybrid funds are considered in this table. The unit for the performance measures is
return(%)/quarter. The time period is from Q2 1991 to Q4 2010. Panel A reports the coefficients
and t-statistics for the panel regression of the future market timing on the fund type (Right=1,
Wrong=0) with time (quarter) fixed effects, clustered by a fund and a quarter. T-stats are from
the panel regression with two types of clusters, as in Petersen (2009). Panel B presents the result
of the t-test to compare the market timing and other performance measures for each type (Right,
Wrong) of funds.
Panel A Right (Dummy) R2 # of Obs Panel B Right Wrong Diff
Market Timing 0.12** 0.03 107,083 Market Timing 0.05 -0.12 0.16***
(2.48) (EW Portfolio) (2.86)
Net Alpha 0.14* 0.04 76,873 Net Alpha 0.11 -0.05 0.16*
(1.85) (EW Portfolio) (1.68)
Gross Alpha 0.15* 0.04 69,529 Gross Alpha 0.47 0.25 0.22*
(1.88) (EW Portfolio) (1.65)
C4 Alpha 0.27** 0.13 76,873 C4 Alpha 0.08 -0.21 0.28**
(2.01) (EW Portfolio) (2.46)
and Wrong funds to test whether MT-sensitive flows follow the skill of fund managers. All of the
performance measures in Table 10 are measured over the next quarter to avoid selection bias from
MT-sensitive flows.
I look into the funds’ performances and the managers’ skills with various measures. Market
timing measure is the active beta change in the future quarter-end multipied by the next quar-
ter market return. Net alpha is measured from the linear projection of fund returns onto three
main Vanguard index funds (S&P 500, Extended Market, and Small-Cap Index) as the alternative
investment opportunities, over the last two years. Gross alpha is measured from the same linear
projection but using gross returns as independent variables. The Carhart four-factor alpha (C4
Alpha) is measured from the excess return when a fund’s return is projected on the returns from
Fama and French three factors (Fama and French (1993)) with the momentum factor.
When testing the outperformance of fund managers with MT-sensitive inflows from individual
fund returns, the correlations among individual fund returns lower statistical power. To address
this, I use two different methods. First, I run a panel regression with the time-fixed effects and
the t-statistics which account for two dimensions of within cluster (fund-quarter) correlation, as in
Petersen (2009). Second, I also build an equal-weighted portfolio of the stock holdings of funds with
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MT-sensitive inflows and funds with MT-sensitive outflows, and test whether there is a significant
difference between their performances. Also, by comparing fund performances over the next quarter,
I avoid potential self-selection bias that may arise from categorizing funds based on the past equity
share change.
The funds with MT-sensitive inflows have better market timing skills than the ones with out-
flows, by approximately 12 bps (from panel regression) to 16 bps (from comparing equal-weighted
porfolio of funds in each group). Also, the funds with MT-sensitive inflows yield a positively
significant alpha when I use Vanguard index funds as the relevant opportunity set for passive in-
vestments (11 bps over the next quarter), or Fama-French four factors (8 bps the next quarter)
as risk compensations. These results support the existence of sophisticated mutual fund investors
who choose mutual funds as their tool to outperform other alternative passive investments. While
not reported, when I use value-weighted portfolios instead of equal-weighted portfolios, a similar
but weaker outperformances of fund managers with MT-sensitive inflows are seen, suggesting that
fund size may erode the skill of fund managers.
Using the market timing measure based only on the future equity share change and the future
market return, I can extract the market timing skill that does not come from their current equity
share change. Therefore, the investors responsible for MT-sensitive fund flows can expect, on aver-
age, the funds they invest in to have future market timing skill. Furthermore, the additional return
difference from alpha suggests that the current market timing activity can also be an indication
of other skills that fund managers with MT-sensitive inflows may have. This provides additional
rationale why there exist investors who invest on mutual funds based on their information about
the market.
4.2 Investor Sophistication Behind Market Timing-Sensitive Flows
In this subsection, I test the sophistication of investors whose mutual fund investments mimic
MT-sensitive flows. Using retail trading data from Barber and Odean (2001), I examine whether
investors who mimic MT-sensitive flows in their mutual fund investments outperform other investors
whose mutual fund investments are in the opposite direction to MT-sensitive flows, in their stock
investments. Using their data on stock trading, most of which is disjoint with their mutual fund
trading, I can compare their stock portfolio performances and, where there is any evidence of
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sophistication, investigate the source of sophistication.
Using brokerage data on household holding portfolio from January 1991 through December 1996,
I sort households into two groups based on their choice on mutual funds. I first index the funds
in the equity share change quartile with MT-sensitive inflows as one, and the funds in the quartile
with MT-sensitive outflows as zero. Then I calculate the value-weighted index of their mutual
fund investments to observe whether each investor (household) is aligned with MT-sensitive flows
in the same direction. I refer to the households that have stock portfolios with value-weighted
indices larger than 75% as “Timers,” and the households with value-weighted indices smaller than
25% as “Non-timers (NTimers).” Since MT-sensitive flow measure can be a noisy signal of the
information that sophisticated investors have, I only consider the cases when MT-sensitive flows
clearly determine which funds are timers or NTimers, with the deviation of at least 30% of its
standard deviation from the mean.
To avoid low statistical power of tests due to potential correlations among individual household
returns, I use similar methods as laid out in Section 4.1. First, I run the panel regression of
individual stock portfolio performances on the indicator variable, which is one for Timers and
zero for NTimers, with time-fixed effects and clustered correlation within households and months.
Timers significantly outperform NTimers on average by 22 bps per month. Second, I build a
equal-weighted portfolio of the stock holdings of timers and NTimers, and test whether there is a
significant difference between their performances. In the portfolio analysis, timers also outperform
30 bps per month.
The result from these two tests are summarized in Table 11. In addition to the outperformance
of Timers, significant market timing difference from panel regression and significant alpha difference
between equal-weighted portfolio performances of Timers and NTimers support the sophistication of
timers in their stock trading. Less significant market timing difference from portfolio performances
of Timers and NTimers indicates that market timing difference is concentrated in subperiods, and
the average market timing of Timers is volatile over time. This is plausible since the market
timing of investors measured is large only when the future market return is large. Similarly, less
significant alpha difference in panel regression indicates that the stock picking skill of Timers is
volatile cross-sectionally; however, Timers’ average stock picking skill is steady over the time period.
This supports the sophistication of investors behind MT-sensitive flows.
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Table 11 Trading of Retail Investors Whose Mutual Fund Investments Mimic MT-sensitive Flows
Table 11 compares the stock portfolio performances of Timers and NTimers (Non-timers). Panel
A presents the coefficient and t-statistics for the regression of the future performance of each
household’s stock portfolio on the dummy variable, which is one for Timers and zero for NTimers,
with time-fixed. The t-stats account for two dimensions of within cluster (household-month)
correlations, as in Petersen (2009). Panel B reports the monthly return from equal-weighted
portfolios that combine stock holdings of Timers vs. NTimers. The t-test in Panel B compares the
monthly return of these two portolios. Market timing is defined as Jensen’s beta multiplied by the
next month’s market return. Only the case when MT-sensitive flows clearly determine which funds
are Right or Wrong is considered, where the flows deviate at least 30% of its standard deviation
from the mean. Households that only have one or zero mutual fund is excluded. There are 54
months available in the sample. Also, the households with less than $10,000 invested were excluded.
Panel A: Panel Regression Timer(Dummy) R2 T-stat # of Obs.
Next-month Return (Gross) 0.22* 0.25 1.89 14,943
Market Timing (Next-month) 0.05* 0.79 1.86 14,943
Jensen’s Alpha (Next-month) 0.18 0.03 1.51 14,943
Panel B: EW Portfolio Performance Timer NTimer Diff T-stat # of Obs.
Next-month Return (Gross) 1.09 0.79 0.30** 2.34 54
Market Timing (Next-month) 0.74 0.70 0.05 1.30 54
Jensen’s Alpha (Next-month) 0.35 0.10 0.25* 1.93 54
5 Conclusion
In this research, I show how to extract mutual fund flows that respond to the market timing
of mutual funds and show that they can predict future market return. The predictability of future
market return from MT-sensitive flows is economically significant over the next two to twelve
months, without evidence of reversal. This predictability remains regardless of whether the beta
change or the equity share change is used to build the flows, and even when using sub-samples in
different time periods.
Institutional investors have an important role to provide information to MT-sensitive flows that
predict long-run market return. It is consistent with the fact that higher level of sophistication is
expected from them. Their investment in MT-sensitive flows can be explained by macroeconomic
variables such as dividend yields that are known to predict the market. However, retail investors
also contribute to short-term market return predictability, which is hard to be explained by other
macroeconomic variables or fund flow measures.
There are two main groups of funds that exhibit predictability: hybrid funds and domestic
active equity funds. Absence of predictability from inactive domestic equity funds or international
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funds suggest that the source of predictability is active investment in the US stock market. The
firms with high uncertainty such as low book-to-market firms, small firms, high beta firms, firms
with superior past performance, and firms with bad quality have greater predictability from MT-
sensitive flows. This result is consistent with the theoretical research on active learning of investors
which shows that investors have greater benefit on learning assets with higher uncertainty.
I analyze the relationship between MT-sensitive flows and the investment performances of both
mutual funds and fund investors. I show that mutual fund managers who enjoy MT-sensitive
inflows outperform in the future, suggesting that these flows follow fund managers with skill. This
result is consistent with existing literature that shows that rational mutual investors reward fund
managers’ skills (Gruber (1996) and Berk and Van Binsbergen (2013)). I also provide evidence on
the sophisticated trading of investors whose mutual fund investments mimic MT-sensitive flows.
The retail trading data of these investors supports that they have valuable information about the
market.
My research contributes to both market predictability and mutual fund literatures. First, my
research contributes to the market predictability and investment strategy literature by showing
the predictability of future market return from a specific fund flow measure that responds to the
active investment of mutual funds. The predictability of future market return and risk factors
from MT-sensitive flows can be used to improve various investment strategies. Second, my research
provides evidence on the existence of sophisticated mutual fund investors, who can reward the
fund managers with skill. Their existence explains how the mutual fund industry or other financial
intermediaries contribute to market efficiency by rewarding fund managers with skill.
31
Chapter II
Information in Emerging Market Mutual
Fund Flows
1 Introduction
This section analyzes investors’ responses to mutual funds’ changes in allocations to emerging
markets. One can interpret funds’ changes in allocations as efforts to time emerging markets. I refer
to the capital flows that respond to the emerging market timing of mutual funds as emerging market
timing-sensitive (EMT-sensitive) flows. EMT-sensitive flows measure the difference in investors’
aggregate responses to mutual funds based on their most recent changes in allocation to each
emerging market. When the flows to the funds with increasing weights on a specific emerging
market are greater than the flows to the funds with decreasing weights, I hypothesize that the
emerging market return will be positive on average over the next one to twelve months. I show
that EMT-sensitive flows are positively correlated with the future market. I also find that the
predictability of equal-weighted emerging market returns from equal-weighted EMT-sensitive flows
is significant, and this is not explained by macroeconomic variables such as the U.S. dividend yield
or term spreads which are used as proxies for global economic states.
Whether there exist valuable information in mutual fund flows is in debate. While Teo and Woo
(2004) and Frazzini and Lamont (2008) support that there exists investor sentiment in mutual fund
flows by showing price reversals after flows, Zheng (1999) and Keswani and Stolin (2008) show that
there is “smart money effect” in mutual fund flows - i.e., there is valuable information is in mutual
fund flows. Cha and Lee (2001) argue that mutual fund flows seem to be influenced by investors’
forecast on fundamentals of firms and their demand on these firms. Other studies suggest that
mutual fund flows can be a mixture of rational flows with information and irrational flows from
behavioral bias. The co-existence of these flows were also suggested in Gruber (1996) to explain the
rapid growth of the mutual fund industry despite the lack of evidence for outperformance of active
mutual funds compared to passive investments. Del Guercio and Reuter (2014) show that investors
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who directly invest in mutual funds chase the outperformance of mutual funds and therefore their
investment can be rationalized, while investors who invest in mutual funds through brokers do not
rely on the performance of funds and are therefore irrational.
There are fewer studies assessing the same issues on international mutual fund flows, especially
on emerging market mutual fund flows. Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (2001) provides an
overview on mutual fund activities in emerging markets, reporting high volatility of emerging
market mutual fund flows with large redemptions and injections from investors. Coval and Stafford
(2007) and Jotikasthira, Lundblad, and Ramadorai (2012) show a mispricing mechanism from
flow-driven pricing pressures, but they do not attribute the result to rationality or irrationality of
investors. Patro (2006) shows that there is also return-chasing behavior in international mutual
fund flows. Since the behavior of international mutual fund investors, especially those of emerging
market mutual fund investors, is closely related to the contagion of economic crises in 90s and 2000s
around the world, there is a need for further research on their behavior reflected in capital flows.
International mutual fund flows contribute to international portfolio flows on which there are
more studies. Portes and Rey (2005) show that international equity flows among developed coun-
tries are mostly determined by variables related to the geography, such as information transmission
and information asymmetries between domestic and foreign investors. Albuquerque, Bauer, and
Schneider (2007) report that U.S. investors increase their market share in countries with recent
positive returns. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine (2002) show a structural relationship among
capital flows, returns, dividend yields and world interest rates in emerging countries with VAR
analysis. Edison and Warnock (2008) also analyze capital flows to emerging markets and show that
global factors such as slack U.S. economic activity is associated with increased flows to emerging
markets. Agosin and Huaita (2012) report the overreaction and sudden stop in emerging market
capital flows.
Several studies suggest the predictability of emerging market returns based on various factors.
Harvey (1995) report the importance of local factors to predict emerging market returns due to
disintegration of these markets. Bekaert and Harvey (1997) report that unlike developed market
returns, emerging market returns are persistent and therefore significantly predicted by their past
returns. My work contributes to the studies on emerging market return predictability by showing
that emerging market mutual fund flows can provide valuable information about the market, not
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just from pricing pressure but also from sophisticated mutual fund investors.
This result is also consistent with the information in domestic mutual fund flows. Flow-based
return predictor in Cho (2015) has predictability of domestic US market returns when it is derived
from the US equity share change of mutual funds . Despite the high volatility and limited historical
data in emerging stock markets, I report a positive correlation between EMT-sensitive flows and
future emerging market returns in most countries. Furthermore, equal-weighted emerging market
returns can be significantly predicted by equal-weighted EMT-sensitive flows covering 14 emerging
markets that have a substantial number of mutual funds in the EPFR Mutual Fund Flows Data.
This predictability cannot be explained by emerging market investors’ response to economic state
variables such as the U.S. dividend yield. Also, emerging market country-wide momentum or
predictability from past emerging market returns cannot explain the predictability from EMT-
sensitive flows.
As in Cho (2015), these flows respond to valuable information about mutual fund performances,
i.e., mutual funds’ changes in allocations to emerging markets. Therefore, the positive correlation
between EMT-sensitive flows and future market returns supports the existence of sophisticated
emerging market mutual fund investors in the market. Furthermore, the predictability from equal-
weighted EMT-sensitive flows covering 14 emerging markets on their equal-weighted returns is
highly significant, and I report that this result is even stronger than in the U.S. market. There are
three main explanations for this result. First, international investment is highly correlated with
investors’ sophistication (Kimball and Shumway (2006)). Second, while there is low barrier to direct
market participation in the domestic market, many emerging markets still have implicit barriers
(Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2011)) and investors look to mutual funds to invest in
these markets. Third, there is greater share of institutional investors on emerging market mutual
funds compared to domestic ones.
The layout of the Section II is as follows. Section 2 describes the mutual fund characteristics
and flows data used in this paper. Section 3 shows the predictability of emerging market returns
from EMT-sensitive flows. Section 4 concludes the section.
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2 Data Description
2.1 EPFR Mutual Fund Flows Data
To analyze investors’ response to the investment activities of emerging market mutual funds,
data on capital flows to emerging market mutual funds along with their country allocation change
is needed. In this Part, I use the Emerging Portfolio Fund Research (EPFR) Global fund flows and
allocation data for emerging market mutual fund flows, sizes, country allocations, and basic fund
characteristics such as index or non-index funds. The EPFR data covers 1,182 funds which invested
in stock markets in 68 different countries from December 1995 to July 2013. Fund sizes (total net
asset value, TNA), flows, and characteristics are available from October 2000 to November 2013.
There are also monthly mutual fund country allocation data and weekly mutual fund flows data.
Funds report their country allocation data to EPFR at the end of each month. Fund flows data
are collected on every Wednesday and made available at EPFR in the beginning of the following
week.
The data I use in this section is a subset of data covered in Jotikasthira et al. (2012). While
they included every mutual fund that has nonzero emerging market holding, I only include funds
that are categorized as emerging market mutual funds. Since my analysis focuses on the investors’
choice among different mutual funds based on their emerging market timing decision, considering
only emering market mutual funds helps clarify the information in these flows.
Most mutual funds in this dataset have their domicile in the United States, United Kingdom, or
other European countries, suggesting that most fund flows come from developed countries. More
than 90% of mutual funds use USD or GBP as their main currency, and also more than 90% of
mutual funds are non-index funds. I did not exclude bond funds since emerging market bond
markets and stock markets have higher correlation compared to developed markets, and fund flows
to bond funds and equity funds may rely on similar information.
I only include funds that have both weekly flows and lagged monthly allocation data. I screen
out mutual funds in EFPR data whose size is less than five million USD, or those that report
themselves as non-equity funds or index funds. To be consistent with the monthly fund allocation
data, I merge weekly fund flows to monthly flows for each month and only consider them as monthly
flows.
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The summary statistics are reported in Table 12. From the standard deviation of the monthly
country allocation change of emerging market mutual funds, the active emerging market timing
of these funds can be inferred. The mean holding change in Table 12 denotes the average abso-
lute monthly country allocation change of mutual funds on each emerging market. The standard
deviation of holding change shows how dispersed the country allocation change is.
Table 12 Summary Statistics of Mutual Fund Investments by Country
The statistics reported in Table 12 are the average values of the estimates from each month. The
holding change in equity share is defined as the monthly percent AUM change on each emerging
market.
Emerging Market Mutual Funds
# of Funds Holding (%) Std Dev(Holding) Holding Change (%) Std Dev(Change)
Brazil 353 23.28 18.92 1.21 2.03
China 399 14.53 9.73 1.10 1.88
Czech 234 4.90 5.19 0.59 1.08
Hungary 289 5.81 6.90 0.65 1.26
India 345 7.62 4.45 0.71 1.15
Indonesia 400 3.95 3.25 0.51 0.94
Korea 379 16.27 7.47 1.03 1.57
Malaysia 385 3.84 2.89 0.50 0.89
Mexico 332 12.89 11.49 0.93 1.63
Poland 306 9.13 10.90 0.83 1.57
Russia 362 20.30 20.45 1.26 2.24
Taiwan 319 12.26 5.32 0.92 1.40
Thailand 369 3.77 2.96 0.48 0.86
Turkey 324 7.31 7.20 0.89 1.66
2.2 Emerging Market Returns and Other Macroeconomic Variables
Emerging market stock returns for 14 countries used in this section are calculated from Morgan
Stanley Capital International (MSCI) indices, both in U.S. dollar and local currencies. These
countries are Brazil,China,CzechRepublic, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea (South), Malaysia,
Mexico, Poland, Russia, Taiwan, Thailand, andTurkey. These countries also have sufficient number
of samples (at least 40 per month) in EPFR Mutual Fund Country Allocation Data. U.S. dividend
yield is calculated from CRSP value-weighted portfolio, and term spread, which is the difference
between the yields on long-term and short-term Treasury bonds, is provided by the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis.
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3 Emerging Market Returns and Mutual Fund Flows
3.1 How to Construct Emerging Market Timing-Sensitive Flows
I categorize the funds based on their last monthly country share change into quartiles. Ic1
denotes the top quartile, a group of mutual funds with the greatest country allocation increases in
country c, and Ic2 denotes the bottom quartile, a group of mutual funds with the greatest country
allocation decreases in country c. When I attribute funds to Ic1 or Ic2, I exclude funds with no
holding percentage change on that market since these funds are likely the ones that do not report
their holding to EPFR in that month. Emerging market timing-sensitive flows for country c in









where FFi, t is fund flows to mutual fund i during the month t, and MFIct−1 is the aggregate
mutual fund industry size in the dataset that has nonzero holding at country c at either month
t−1 or month t. For each month, I subtract the aggregate fund flows to Ic2 from the aggregate fund
flows to Ic1 to extract the difference in investors’ aggregate response to each group, and I normalize
it with MFIct−1. When this measure is positive, investors respond positively to the increase in
country allocation change of mutual funds, and vice versa.
Figure 2. The Time Window of Mutual Fund Country Allocation, Fund Flows, and Future Market
Return
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Table 13 Summary Statistics for Stock Market Returns and Emerging Market Timing-sensitive
Flows by Country
Table 13 reports the mean and volatility of monthly emerging market returns and monthly
EMT-sensitive flows. The statistics for the U.S. is from Cho (2015). EW row reports the mean
and volatility of equal-weighted emerging market returns and EMT-sensitive flows.
Summary Statistics
Monthly Return (Mean) Monthly Return (Vol) EMTft (Mean) EMTft (Vol)
Brazil 1.70 10.73 0.10 1.13
China 1.67 8.38 -0.08 1.07
Czech 1.84 8.53 -0.03 1.32
Hungary 1.35 11.33 -0.17 1.20
India 1.61 9.31 0.09 1.09
Indonesia 2.30 9.54 -0.19 1.09
Korea 1.34 9.02 -0.14 1.07
Malaysia 1.33 5.17 -0.40 1.06
Mexico 1.51 7.68 -0.00 1.14
Poland 1.17 10.41 -0.20 1.13
Russia 1.94 10.95 -0.03 1.00
Taiwan 0.71 7.57 -0.20 1.06
Thailand 1.93 8.08 -0.16 1.03
Turkey 1.83 12.47 0.03 1.11
US 0.50 4.50 -0.01 0.07
EW 1.59 7.58 -0.10 0.34
Figure 2 illustrates the chronological order of country allocation changes, fund flows (MT-
sensitive flows), and the future market return. I categorize mutual funds into Ic1 and Ic2 based on
the most recently available monthly equity holding change. Then I aggregate the mutual fund flows
to build the fund flow difference measure at month t. I use this measure to test the predictability
of market return after month t, over two to twelve months.
To include an enough number of funds to build EMT-sensitive flows, I only include countries
that have at least 40 mutual funds that hold assets in them for each month. These countries are
Brazil, China, Hungary, India, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Russia, Taiwan, Thailand, and
Turkey. Table 13 reports the summary statistics of monthly emerging market excess returns and
monthly EMT-sensitive flows from these 14 countries. Compared to the domestic statistics from
Section I, high volatility level of EMT-sensitive flows is notable. This is mostly due to the small
number of mutual fund samples for each country compared to the fund samples for the U.S. market.
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Table 14 Regression Coefficients of the Emerging Market Returns in US Dollars on MT-sensitive
Flows Based on Recent Equity Holding Change over Different Horizons.
The statistics reported in Table 14 columns with “n month” are the regression coefficients of
monthly emerging market returns onto EMT-sensitive flows, over the n months from the month
with emerging market timing-sensitive flows. Only non-index emerging market funds in EPFR
dataset that has nonzero change in each emerging market are considered. The monthly market-
timing sensitive flow observations span from January 2002 to September 2013. EMT-sensitive
flows used in the regression are standardized. Therefore, these coefficients are the average return
from each market when there is one standard deviation emerging MT-sensitive flow.
Horizon (# of Months after fund flows)
Month 3 month 6 month 12 month 24 month
Brazil 0.22 2.00 7.68 15.25*
China 0.16 0.94 -3.30 -6.65**
Czech 1.22 0.52 1.30 4.72
Hungary 0.27 3.98** 7.23 0.65
India -1.20 0.41 -0.28 8.35*
Indonesia 2.65* 1.27 6.33 10.60
South Korea 2.24** 1.69 -3.56 -1.23
Malaysia 0.31 0.10 -0.21 1.50
Mexico 0.01 0.31 4.91** 5.98**
Poland 1.55 3.16** 5.02* 6.05
Russia 1.00 4.24* 12.07*** 16.10***
Taiwan 0.19 1.06 2.92** -0.36
Thailand 0.93 3.44* 10.00*** 6.48
Turkey -0.97 -0.99 -4.10 4.30
3.2 Market Return Predictability from Emerging Mutual Fund Flows
3.2.1 Correlation between the Future Market Returns and EMT-sensitive Flows
If EMT-sensitive flows contain valuable information about future emerging market returns, these
flows will predict future emerging market returns. To test the predictability, I run the following
regression:
rcmt, t+k = α+ βc · EMTfct + δc · Controlct + εit+k,t+l
rcmt, t+k is the market excess return of country c for the next k months after observing EMT-
sensitive flow EMTft at month t, and Controlt might include lagged emerging market returns.
macrot can be global macroeconomic variables. Controlt and macrot will account for different
regression specifications.
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Table 15 Regression Coefficients of the Emerging Market Returns in US Dollar with Lagged
Quarterly Returns, on MT-sensitive Flows Based on Recent Equity Holding Change over Different
Horizons
The statistics reported in Table 15 columns with “n month” are the regression coefficients of
monthly emerging market returns onto EMT-sensitive flows and lagged quarterly returns, over the
n months from the month with emerging market timing-sensitive flows. Only non-index emerging
market funds in EPFR dataset that has nonzero change in each emerging market are considered.
The monthly market-timing sensitive flow observations span from January 2002 to September
2013. EMT-sensitive flows used in the regression are standardized. Therefore, these coefficients are
the average return from each market when there is one standard deviation emerging MT-sensitive
flow.
Horizon (# of Months after fund flows)
Month 3 month 6 month 12 month 24 month
Brazil 0.05 1.83 8.09 15.34*
China 1.01 1.02 -4.76* -6.93**
Czech 0.80* 0.57 1.50 3.71
Hungary 0.28 4.00*** 4.62 -0.66
India -1.04 0.65 0.46 8.17*
Indonesia 2.33* 0.15 5.64 10.52*
South Korea 2.43** 1.98 -0.47 -1.70
Malaysia 0.43 0.38 1.73 0.94
Mexico 0.49 0.67 2.63 6.05**
Poland 1.59* 2.79** 2.01 5.97
Russia 1.27 4.26* 10.61*** 15.96**
Taiwan 0.27 0.96 1.31 -0.97
Thailand 0.84 3.35** 7.59** 6.30
Turkey -1.06 -0.99 -3.71 4.61
Table 14 reports the regression coefficients of monthly emerging market returns on EMT-
sensitive flows over the next 3, 6, 12, and 24 months, respectively, without other controlling
variables. Table 15 reports the same result but with lagged emerging market returns as a con-
trol variable. Standard deviation of estimates are calculated with Newey-West with 12 lags for first
two columns, 24 lags for the 12-month returns, and 36 lags for the 24-month returns. Except two
countries in both six-month and twelve-month horizons, every country reports positive returns on
average after positive EMT-sensitive flows arrive at mutual funds.
A positive correlation between EMT-sensitive flows and future emerging market returns is
observed in most of countries reported in Table 14 and 15. Over the next six months, except Turkey,
all the countries show a positive correlation from EMT-sensitive flows, and for four countries the
predictability is significant. If the countries that show at least one positively significant coefficient
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Table 16 Regression Coefficients of the Emerging Market Returns in Local Currency on MT-
sensitive Flows Based on Recent Equity Holding Change over Different Horizons
The statistics reported in Table 16 columns with “n month” are the regression coefficients of
monthly emerging market returns onto EMT-sensitive flows, over the n months from the month
with emerging market timing-sensitive flows and the global macroeconomic factors such as the
U.S. dividend yields and term spreads. Only non-index emerging market funds in EPFR dataset
that has nonzero change in each emerging market are considered. The monthly market-timing
sensitive flow observations span from January 2002 to September 2013. EMT-sensitive flows used
in the regression are standardized. Therefore, these coefficients are the average return from each
market when there is one standard deviation emerging MT-sensitive flow.
Horizon (# of Months after fund flows)
Month 3 month 6 month 12 month 24 month
Brazil 0.11 1.30 5.35 9.37*
China 0.14 0.87 -5.10* -6.77**
Czech 1.05 1.59 1.43 3.27
Hungary 0.16 3.16** 5.73* 2.89
India -0.96 0.34 0.95 7.97**
Indonesia 1.89* 1.10 4.62 12.60*
South Korea 1.27** 1.01 -0.80 -1.05
Malaysia 0.20 -0.02 1.13 0.66
Mexico 0.18 0.44 2.13 6.38**
Poland 0.99 2.29** 3.70 5.35*
Russia 1.31 4.09* 10.98*** 16.11***
Taiwan -0.03 0.37 0.98 -1.06
Thailand 1.00 2.90* 6.92** 7.02**
Turkey -0.74 -0.86 -3.50 2.71
regardless of different horizons, total 10 out of 14 countries show positive predictability from their
EMT-sensitive flows9.
Table 16 reports the predictability of future emerging market returns in local currency from
EMT-sensitive flows. The coefficients and significance of the predictability reported is similar with
Table 14, suggesting that most information in EMT-sensitive flows is about local returns, not
exchange rates. This is consistent with previous studies about the diffculty to predict exchange
rates.
However, in summary, other countries do not show such significance due to high volatility in
emerging market returns and mutual fund flows. Also, each country might have different investor
responsiveness and therefore EMT-sensitive flows predict the returns over different horizons. There
9China stock market has several regulations until 2004 for foreign investors and therefore has different dynamics
compared to other countries. When I run the same regression since year 2007, all the coefficients over different
horizons were positive, and significant for three-, six-, and twelve-month returns.
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are two ways to give an answer to whether predictability is significant. First, I estimate the
regression coefficients jointly with GMM, and test the joint hypothesis of βc = 0 for every country
c. This test gives χ2 (14)=69.73 (three-month), 123.06 (six-month), 330.06 (12-month), and 623.48
(24-month), suggesting the coefficient is significantly from zero and therefore there exists significant
predictability from EMT-sensitive flows. Second, the predictability can be more distinguished when
it is tested for a group of countries. I will dicuss this in the next section.
3.2.2 Information in EMT-sensitive Flows
Since many emerging market mutual funds use momentum strategy and follow past returns to
exploit emerging market returns that can be predicted from past returns (Kaminsky, Lyons, and
Schmukler (2004)), I analyze whether the predictability from EMT-sensitive flows is affected from
these effects. I control the following factors and observe whether the predictability from EMT-
sensitive flows weaken or strengthen over different emerging markets: 1) lagged one year emerging
market returns, and 2) past emerging market return rankings to account for both absolute and
relative momentum effects from past returns.
These results are summarized in Table 17. The predictability from EMT-sensitive flows on
emerging market returns is tested by controlling for past returns (Panel A) or past return rankings
as quantiles from 29 emerging countries described in Section 7. If the predictabilty from EMT-
sensitive flows is from momentum or any past-return related strategy of emerging market mutual
funds, the predictbility level will decrease from the analysis in the previous section.
However, Table 17 shows the predictability still remains significant for most of the countries,
and is even stronger for some emerging markets. The information in EMT-sensitive flows is not
related to emerging market flows that respond to the past emerging market returns. Furthermore,
the robust predictability result suggests that this predictability is not related to fund managers’
investment strategies which respond to past returns, i.e. emerging market country momentum or
reversal. This result is also consistent with the findings outlined in Section I for domestic mutual
fund investors.
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Table 17 Regression Coefficients of the Emerging Market Returns in US Currency on MT-sensitive
Flows over Different Horizons with Controlling Past Returns and Past Return Rankings
The statistics reported in Table 17 reports the same statistics as Table 16 with lagged emerging
market returns and past return rankings to consider momentum or smart money effects of emerging
market mutual fund investments. The columns with “n month” are the regression coefficients of
monthly emerging market returns onto EMT-sensitive flows, over the n months from the month
with emerging market timing-sensitive flows, lagged one year emerging market returns (Panel A)
or lagged return rankings (Panel B) among 30 emerging markets that constitute major holdings
of EPFR emerging mutual funds. Only non-index emerging market funds in EPFR dataset that
has nonzero change in each emerging market are considered. The monthly market-timing sensitive
flow observations span from January 2002 to September 2013. EMT-sensitive flows used in the
regression are standardized. Therefore, these coefficients are the average return from each market
when there is one standard deviation emerging MT-sensitive flow.
Horizon (# of Months after fund flows) Horizon (# of Months after fund flows)
Month 3 month 6 month 12 month 24 month 3 month 6 month 12 month 24 month
Brazil 1.10 4.07* 7.48 18.33** 0.98 3.77 7.07 18.18**
China 0.73 1.76 -4.45* -4.22 0.49 1.39 -4.89* -2.97
Czech -0.88 -1.15 -1.46 -0.79 -0.79 -0.90 -0.35 3.00
Hungary 0.10 5.09*** 7.42 1.43 0.23 5.38*** 7.37 -0.73
India -1.29 -1.49 2.85 11.25*** -1.46 -1.94 2.20 10.68***
Indonesia 1.81 -0.36 1.37 6.36 2.08 0.61 3.60 10.18*
South Korea 1.17 0.37 -0.10 -3.97* 1.34 0.73 0.33 -2.73
Malaysia 0.78** 0.92* 2.80 1.45* 0.71** 0.85 2.89 1.20
Mexico 0.69 1.60* 2.11 5.64** 0.77 2.20** 3.15 6.39***
Poland 0.55 0.58 2.91** -2.26* 0.74 1.15 3.46** -0.19
Russia 3.74** 3.12 12.27*** 15.97** 3.75** 3.25 12.49*** 15.38**
Taiwan 0.44 1.40* 1.11 -1.02* 0.33 1.21* 1.01 -1.46*
Thailand 2.48*** 4.87*** 8.80*** 7.30** 2.39*** 4.89*** 8.36** 4.95
Turkey -1.36 -1.45 -1.85 -0.48 -1.42 -1.46 -1.63 -0.73
3.2.3 Asset Pricing Implication on Diversified Emerging Market Portfolio
As mentioned from Table 13, EMT-sensitive flows are highly volatile due to the small number
of available samples. The number of monthly mutual fund observations that has investment in any
of these 14 countries from the last section ranges from 40 to 182, which is much smaller than the
number of fund-quarter observations for the U.S. market from 509 to 3920. Therefore, a country
by country analysis in Section 8.2.1 may both lack power.
In this section, I will use country groupings to present the predictability result. Since each
emerging market is highly volatile with noise in emerging market economies, testing predictability
of diversified emerging market portfolio returns from the information in aggregate EMT-sensitive
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flows would remove these idiosyncratic noises. I use two different types of groupings. First, I will
use both equity-weighted return and equity-weighted EMT-sensitive flows from the 14 countries.
Second, I will use equal-weighted return but use the aggregate holding change of mutual funds on
the 14 countries to build monthly EMT-sensitive flows.









′ ·macrot + εit+k,t+l
This regression is justified when I assume 1) country by country regression rcmt, t+k = α + βc ·
EMTfct+δ
′ ·Controlct+εit+k,t+l has same βc for every country c, and 2) EMTfct = ÊMTfct+εct
with i.i.d εct when ÊMTfct is the true investors’ response to the country c. Table 13 reports
that the volatility weighting would be close to the equal weighting since EMT-sensitive flows from
the 14 countries have similar monthly volatilities. Therefore, there is no specific country that is
significantly over- or under-weighted from this scheme.









where Ic1 and Ic2 denote the top and bottom quartile based on total allocation change in
the 14 countries. FFi, t is fund flows to mutual fund i during the month t, and MFI
eq
t−1 is the
aggregate mutual fund industry size in the dataset that has nonzero holding at any of the 14
countries at either month t − 1 or month t. For each month, I subtract the aggregate fund flows
to Ic2 from the aggregate fund flows to Ic1 and normalize it with MFI
eq
t−1. This scheme will also
reduce the idiosyncratic fund flow noise in EMT-sensitive flows. However, country-specific valuable
information in EMT-sensitive flows might be lost since now EMTfeqt measures investors’ aggregate





14 = α+ β · EMTf
eq
t + γ
′ ·macrot + εit+k,t+l
From these two grouping schemes, I will test the predictability of equal-weighted portfolio
returns over 14 countries mentioned in the previous section, from equal-weighted EMT-sensitive
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flows of each of these countries. This procedure reduces both noise in emerging market returns
and fund flows. This is especially true since large capital flow to one specific mutual fund can
affect the predictability test if there are not enough mutual funds, aggregating EMT-sensitive flows
can reduce not only country-specific idiosyncratic errors in returns but also minimize fund-specific
idiosyncratic errors in fund flows.
Table 18 Regression Coefficients of the Emerging Market Returns on MT-sensitive Flows Based
on Recent Equity Holding Change over Different Horizons.
Table 18 reports the predictability of equal-weighted emerging market returns from equal-weighted
emerging market-timing sensitive flows. For each emerging market, emerging market timing-
sensitive (EMT-sensitive) flows are defined as the total flows to the funds above medium holding
change minus the total flows to the funds below medium holding change, divided by the total
net asset value of mutual funds that possess positive amount in the market. EMTft is the
equal-weighted EMT-sensitive flows from the 14 countries described in the previous section. divt
is the dividend yield of CRSP value-weighted portfolio during the previous one year, and termt
is the difference between the 10-year Treasury bond yield and the 3-month T-bill rate. rex−trmt,t+k
is the equal-weighted emerging market excess return of the countries above, substracted from
the domestic US treasury rate, over the end of month t to the end of month t + k. rex−USmt,t+k is
the equal-weighted emerging market excess return in excess of domestic US market return. The
samples are from January 2002 to September 2013.
Flows Control
A EMTf t divt termt R
2 Obs.
rex−trmt,t+6 3.58*** 0.02 128
(3.91)
rex−USmt,t+6 1.69** 0.02 128
(2.40)
rem−trmt,t+6 3.57*** 21.21** -1.68 0.15 133
(4.44) (2.14) (-0.82)
rex−USmt,t+6 4.10*** 20.57** -1.62 0.13 133
(5.35) (2.00) (-0.77)
B EMTf t divt termt R2 Obs.
rex−trmt,t+6 2.70*** 0.02 128
(3.15)
rex−USmt,t+6 0.63 0.00 128
(1.15)
rem−trmt,t+6 2.69** 14.89* -1.59 0.12 133
(2.22) (1.85) (-0.81)
rex−USmt,t+6 0.59 6.11** -1.27 0.07 133
(0.87) (1.07) (-1.17)
I summarize in Table 18 the predictability of the equal-weighted emerging market returns over
the next six months, from equal-weighted EMT-sensitive flows. Panel A reports the result from the
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first scheme, and Panel B reports the second scheme. When there is one standard deviation shock
to the EMT-sensitive flows, a six-month equal-weighted emerging market return is expected to be
3.58% in excess of risk-free rate in the US, and 1.69% in excess of US stock market excess return.
Though the predictability from the second scheme is also significant, the significance is less than
the first scheme, indicating that country-specific EMT-sensitive fund flows have some additional
valuable information about emerging markets.
Interestingly, this predictability holds even when controlling for other macroeconomic variables
such as the U.S. dividend yield or term spreads as a global factor that are known to proxy for
economic states, suggesting that the information in EMT-sensitive flows are distinct from these
variables. Despite unreported here, there is no sign of reversal – instead, the positive predictability
continues even over the year after one year gap.
4 Conclusion
In this research, I show emerging market mutual fund flows that respond to the market timing
of mutual funds have valuable information about future emerging market returns. I build fund flow
measures called EMT-sensitive flows that extract the difference in investors’ aggregate response
to mutual funds based on their emerging market allocation change, and test whether they predict
emerging market returns. Positive correlation between EMT-sensitive flows and future emerging
market returns are widespread among different countries. Specifically for six-month returns, all
the countries except Turkey report the positive correlation. This predictability is not explained by
country-wise return momentum or reversal.
Though the predictability is not significant for some emerging markets if the regression analysis
is conducted on each individual country due to noise in both emerging market returns and monthly
EMT-sensitive flows, it shows strong predictability of diversified emering market portfolio. The
predictability of future market emerging return from equal-weighted EMT-sensitive flows from
each emerging market is economically significant over the next one to twelve months, without
evidence of reversal. Also, EMT-sensitive flows that rely on the aggregate allocation in the 14
countries considered in this Section III also predict their equal-weighted return significantly. This
predictability remains after controlling for macroeconomic variables.
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These results contribute to the relationship between mutual fund investors and mutual funds.
The existence of rational mutual fund flows with valuable information contribute to the survival of
mutual funds with skill to outperform in the market, and reward the fund managers who outperform
in the market. It is also worth noting that compared to the research on domestic mutual funds,
research on emerging market mutual fund flows are rare. Considering the high level of investor
sophistication of investors who hold international assets, the role of rational flows in emerging
market mutual fund industry can be larger than ones in domestic fund flows. Furthermore, less
alternative investment options to allocate wealth on emerging markets rather than using mutual
funds compared to domestic investment can strengthen the result, which come out as a strong
predictability of emerging market returns.
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Chapter III
Sophistication, Market Opacity, and Price
Efficiency: General Equilibrium Implications
of Bounded Rationality
1 Introduction
It is realistic to assume that investors have limited resource and time to learn information.
Investors are not optimizing their decision flawlessly and continuously, as Keynes asserted in his
concept of “stickiness.” Sims (2003) justifies that investors have bounded rationality to digest
available information, and analyzes how it affects their learning decision and equilibrium. If in-
vestors are boundedly rational, in that they do not have complete processing capacity as assumed
in rational expectations models, they have to decide how to allocate their capacity and learn. My
research is about how investors decide to focus on several information sources.
In Section III, I solve how investors trade off learning about different elements, such as terminal
dividend (fundamental value) vs. market structure (learning from price requires knowing demand
schedules and market clearing conditions). This model allows us to analyze how the level of market
opacity – who trades, and why – and investor sophistication affects the price efficiency, risk, and
return, when information allocation decisions are endogenous in general equilibrium.
This model is a generalization of previous rational expectations models such as Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980) (GS below). By adding a learning by signals to GS, I can set two available informa-
tion channels that investors can exploit: fundamental channel (asset payoff) and price (aggregate
supply) channel. Investors decide to allocate their information capacity first, and this determines
the precison of their signals on asset fundamental and aggregate supply. They choose the optimal
demand from those signals and the price, and the price is chosen to clear the market.
I show how different types of learning (or different types of belief on the price) can co-exist in
the market, and when specialization or generalization in learning is beneficial. My model endo-
genizes the learning type as fundamentalists or chartists in Frankel and Froot (1990) and Froot,
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Scharfstein, and Stein (1992) as I define investors who learn fundamentals as fundamentalists and
who learn aggregate demand as chartists. Therefore, I can explain why there are multiple strategies
of investors, and how their portion changes in the market. This can be explained by information
substitutibility that investors want to learn what others do not learn, and the portion for each
learning type is balanced in an equilibrium.
My work will provide intuition on how the price informativeness, price volatility, social welfare,
and heterogeneity in investors’ information capacity interact to form equilibrium. Policy implication
on the informed agents’ capacity is also available: whether it is beneficial to the whole society or
not if much more accurate information is available only to some investors. With respect to the
dictator’s view on social welfare, I introduced endowment shocks to this economy, as Spiegel and
Subramanyam(1992). Introducing external supply shock to the economy, GS cannot measure the
social welfare exactly; when there is more uncertainty to the market, social welfare increases due
to the convexity of price in social welfare. However, endowments that are correlated to the risky
asset return changes each agent’s exposure to the risk and hides the information of the informed in
the market.
Section III is organized as follows. Chapter 2 is about the economic set-up with bounded
rationality, and information structure. Chapter 3 is about the simple model that price affects
learning but learning does not feed back the price. This chapter is a simple case that highlights
how investors’ learning is decided. Chapter 4 explains the model where equilibrium learning and
prices are affected together by investors’ learning choice. This model has two asset fundamental
factors that have different learning implication. Chapter 5 concludes Section III.
2 Economic Model with Bounded Rationality
This section builds a model with bounded rationality as in Sims (2003) such that investors
decide allocation of their information capacity on either terminal dividend or aggregate demand.
Each agent determines his learning structure first, and then after learning, they will decide their
optimal demand on the risky asset. Price will be determined by market clearing.
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2.1 Information Structure and Endowment
This model can be viewed as an extension of the model in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) with
more plausible interpretations of the variables and bounded rationality conditions. There are two
assets: a risk-free asset and a risky asset whose return is a random variable θ with a normally
distributed prior.
Let’s call I as the set of investors. There are a continuum of agents in this economy – each
individual cannot change the dynamics of the economy. There are two types of agents, type A and
B. λ of agents are type A, and λ is known to everyone. They have two different characteristics:
1) information capacity which can be used to analyze the signal, and 2) labor income distribution.
I will assume that agents attain endowments as aggregate factor with some noise. For type i
agent(i ∈ A,B), xi denotes the labor income of him, and xi = x + εix (εix is i.i.d. for each agent).
Since each agent knows about his endowment,

















)−1, as the posterior variance of x for each agent,




, which represents how individual endowments are volatile compared to the aggregate
endowment in the economy.
Timeline is as follows; at t=0, type i agents decide how to allocate their information capacity
to two information channels, about θ and x. At t=0.5, labor income arrives, and agents know their
labor income (endowment). Endowment comes as a form of risky asset shares(or something that is
correlated to the risky asset – I will assume that they are perfectly correlated to the risky asset).
But they do not know how much agents with the other type received. Also they receive the signal
for θ or x whose variance depends on his information capacity allocation. At t=1, they submit
their demand based upon the signals and the price, and price is determined to clear the market.
And then the return θ is realized, and agents consume their wealth.
At t=0, x is also a random variable ex-ante, with the same prior N (0, V ar (x)). θ has a same
prior N (0, Σθ) for everybody. Signal is the true value of θ or x with some noise εi, and the variance
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of the noise is determined by the information capacity allocated to this channel. I have two different
assumptions on the information structure;
Case 1) Each agent’s learning is purely idiosyncratic (idiosyncratic learning).
Case 2) There is only one public channel available for each signal. First, in the case 1, agent
j (j ∈ I)’s signal on s (s = θ or x) is that sj = s + εj , and εj is independent from each other
(ordered learning).
For the case 2, if two different agents put the same capacity on one channel (either θ or x),
they obtain the same signal. Furthermore, when agent i allocates less capacity than agent j on a
specific channel, if I name the signal of the variable s for agent i and j as si and sj relatively, then
si = s+ εi = s+ εj + ε = sj + ε (all ε, εi, and εj are noises with normal distribution). This can be
interpreted as knowing si does not help ones having sj– Agent i does not know anything about s
that j does not know from his signal. This information structure can be found between investment
banks and individual investors such that investment banks not only invest on their own parts but
also work as a brokerage for individual investors’ deals with observing their demand, and possibly
their signals.
Case 2 can be interpreted as the firms obtain signals through a system that is composed of the
media or data providing companies. More sophisticated agents, such as hedge funds or investment
banks, can observe every signal which is for individual investors who receive signals from mass
media. Furthermore, though each agent has a idiosyncratic signal from its own information channel,
this part will not be reflected in the price if they are not large enough to affect the whole market.
Therefore, despite seemingly strict, this structure (order) of information and its superiority is a
necessary one to analyze the interaction between agents’ learning and the price.
I will solve the case 1 in chapter 3, and case 2 in chapter 4. For each case, each agent i has a
CARA utility function Ui = −exp (a ·Wi1), when Wit is the wealth of agent i at t so that Wi1 is
the wealth after the trade and the return θ is realized. Because of CARA utility function, setting
Wi0 = 0 does not change marginal utility. So I will set Wi0 = 0 for every agent, and this gives us a
benchmark with utility −1 (= exp (−a · 0)) as no-trade case(homogeneous case) without endowment
shock.
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2.2 Information Capacity Constraint (Sims (2003))
As Sims(2003) built, each agent’s information capacity constraint is defined as the upper bound
in the entropy difference. The informativeness of signal X on random variable Y is defined as an
entropy difference, as −E [log2 (p (Y ))] +E [log2 (p (Y | X))], when p(·) is a probability distribution
function. An agent, with information capacity K for what he is trying to analyze, has an informa-
tion capacity constraint as follows:
−E [log2 (p (Y ))] + E [log2 (p (Y | X))] ≤ log2K
(Y: Information, X: Signal)
Here, having normal distribution for Y and Y | X, this constraint can be simplified as:
det (V ar (Y | X)) ≤ det (V ar (Y ))
K
When Y = (Y1, Y2) are independent to each other,
V ar (Y1 | X) · V ar (Y2 | X) ≤
V ar (Y1) · V ar (Y2)
K
2.3 Utility and Equivalent Objective Function
For each case, each agent i has a CARA utility function Ui = −exp (Wi1), when Wit is the
wealth of agent i at t so that Wi1 is the wealth after the trade and the return θ is realized. Because
of CARA utility function, setting Wi0 does not change marginal utility. Assuming a linear price
function to keep multi-mormality of random variables, I have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Regardless of the type, every agent is minimizing V ari (θ | p), the conditional variance
of θ given every information that investor i obtains.
Since a type j (j ∈ A, B) agent i realizes the economy in a different way, the allocation problem
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between θ and x is upon his realization, as follows:
(Σiθ, Σix) = argmax (Ui (W1)) (2)
subject to Wi1 = Di (θ − p) + xip+Wi0 (3)
λDA + (1− λ)DB = x (4)
ΣiθΣix = ΣθΣx/Kj (5)












(there are only two
possible solutions, which will be proved later in this section), then type B agents choose to be one
with more expected utility. When there is no pure equilibrium (type B agents are better off when
they do not follow the others’ decision), I can find a ratio λθ such that 0 < λθ < 1, and expected
utilities of fundamentalists and chartists are same. With this λθ, and given p as a linear function
of θ, and x, (λθ, p) defines the equilibrium as in the below.
In the following sections, I will analyze the general equilibrium, and discuss how learning is
decided and how price reflects asset fundamental and price pressure from aggregate demand, with
different information structure. There will be analysis on price efficiency, risk, and return with this
endogenous learning, too.
2.4 Basic Dynamics (Descriptive)
For Case 1, each investor will allocate all his capacity on the most efficient channel between θ
and x. This will be stated well in chapter 3. For Case 2, since each agent is atomic, type A agents
have to focus on θ fully. Each agent cannot affect or control the correlation between the price and
fundamental or signals. Each agent cannot control type B agents’ learning and demand at one-time
setting, either. Type B agents know that type A agents will focus only on the fundamental, and
they will allocate their capacity upon this knowledge.
Since type A agents’ endowments are uncertain, type B agents might think there can be a
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risk sharing motive when type A agents obtain positive amount of shares. This allows them to
enter the market and breaks no-trade status that may come from that type B agents know they
have less knowledge in this market. Analytically, to type B agents, this situation is same as when
aggregate demand is uncertain in many prior market microstructure papers. However, there is no
noise traders in this market, and this endowment affects agents’ utility directly.
Market clearing condition is as follows:
λDA + (1− λ)DB = x
(Dj (j ∈ {A, B}) is the market share of type j agents that includes endowment, which is the
integration of the share of each agent in the type(A or B))
DA is not revealed to type B agents because x is unknown. Now each agent with type B has
two sources of uncertainty: θ and x. He will allocate his information capacity to maximize ex-ante
utility.
3 Model with Idiosyncratic Learning
In this chapter, I first solve Case 1 on independent learning. Here, learning does not affect price
since learning asset fundamental and aggregate demand are equivalent. However, price function will
determine which information channel is more efficient, and I show how specialization is beneficial to
investors. Therefore, I can concentrate on how investors choose to learn between two information
channels, and its relationship to previous noisy rational expectatios models.
Since there is only one factor in θ, the linear price function always has the form as p = aθ+ bx,
which function as another signal of θ. Therefore, each agent chooses between two information
channels about θ directly. This simplifies the comparison between the efficiencies of two channels,
and restrict equilibrium capacity allocation of the investors.
Theorem 2. Investors specialize in their learning in Case 1; they allocate all their capacities on
the more efficient channel. Information channels are perfect substitutes to each other.
Proof. In the Appendix.
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Investors specialize either asset fundamental or aggregate demand and allocate all their resources
on one channel. Since price also works as another signal of asset fundamental with aggregate demand
as a noise, two information channels are equivalent. Investors now choose more efficient channel,
and everyone specializes his learning. I will define fundamentalists as the ones who choose to learn
only from the fundamental, and chartists as the ones who decide to focus only from the price.
Since the efficiency of the channel is same for every investor, every investor makes the same
choice on his learning unless two channels have the same efficiency. Since two channels are equiv-
alent, there is no feedback from learning to the price. This means that the price is not changed
by different learning choices, if there are fundamentalists with a positive measure. If there is no
one to learn the fundamental, price does not contain the fundamental part, and it is not valuable
to learn. This is the generalized version of Grossman-Stiglitz paradox from Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980) such that if there is nobody informed about the fundamental, it is not worth learning from
the price. However, if anybody learns the fundamental, the price reveals the fundamental more
than the fundmental signal through the information channel.
I will summarize this result in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. The price function from the simple one-factor model does not depend on the ratio
of fundamentalists or chartists in the market. There is no feedback from the learning to the price.
The price function is, c
p = bθ + cx (6)
b =
λKA + (1− λ)KB
λ (KA + 1) + (1− λ) (KB + 1)
(7)
c = − abΣθ
λKA + (1− λ)KB + rx − 1
(8)
In the one-factor model, everybody makes the same choice unless two information channels
have the same efficiency, and this results no-equilibrium area when nobody wants to learn the
fundamental. Specifically, if ρ2ΣθΣx > (λKA+(1− λ)KB+rx−1)2, everybody is a fundamentalist.
If a2ΣθΣx < (λKA + (1− λ)KB + rx − 1)2, there is no equilibrium since there is no fundmantalist
in the economy.
Proof. In the Appendix.
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This result shows how investors become chartists as their information capacity (KA or KB)
increases, economic uncertainty(Σθ or Σx) decreases, or risk aversion(ρ) decreases.
Despite the paradox, I can keep equilibrium result by introducing some stickiness in the learning
decision. Even when everybody wants to be a chartist, I will assume ε (ε > 0) investors are always
fundamentalists regardless of market situation. This will allow information to the price, and keep
the efficiency of the price information channel. Based on this assumption, I will calculate the ex-ante
utility of investors with endogenous learning decision. It is summarized in the next theorem.
Theorem 4. Ex-ante utility of agent i considering endowment shock is a more appropriate measure.
This function is as follows:
−
√√√√ V ari (θ | p, xi)
a2V ar (xi)
(




+ (1− a2V ar (xi) Σθ)V ar (θ − p | xi)
(9)
For Case 1 in this chapter,
−
√
V ari (θ | p, xi)
a2Σx
(
Σθ(1− b) + ba
)2
+ (1− a2ΣxΣθ)V ar (θ − p | xi)
(10)
Social welfare decreases as each investor becomes more sophisticated; social welfare is a de-
creasing fuction of aggregate information capacity of the market. An ability to analyze information
better is good for individuals to outperform others in the market. However, they have a negative
outcome for overall society since risk sharing decreases due to more exact signals.
This model has its limits. Since two information channels are equivalent, they have the same
effect on the price and investors’ learning choice does not change the price function. This keeps the
weight of the price on each factor constant, and so does the efficiency of each information channel.
Therefore, every agent makes the same decision and Grossman-Stiglitz paradox still remains in
this model; when everybody decides to learn aggregate demand schedules, there is no information
available in the price and there is no equilibrium. This will be fixed in the next chapter, which is
about my main model.
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4 Equilibrium with Ordered Learning
In the previous section, investors learn about the terminal value through an idiosyncratic in-
formation channel. However, what if the signals have common source of information and therefore
there exists ordered structure of the information? Ordered structure of the information is defined
as when agent i allocates less capacity than agent j on a specific channel, agent i does not know
anything about s that j does not know from his signal. This kind of information structure can
be found between investment banks and individual investors such that investment banks not only
invest on their own parts but also work as a brokerage for individual investors’ deals with observing
their demand, and possibly their signals.
With idiosyncratic learning, when investors decide not to learn fundamentals, there is no equi-
librium. In this section, by allowing ordered learning in asset fundamental such that what unso-
phisticated investors learn from the price cannot be more accurate than sophisticated investors’
signal, I will avoid this paradox. Furthermore, I show that there exists unique equilibrium price
determined from investors’ learning such that price reflects asset fundamental more if there are
more fundamentalists who learn asset fundamental in the market.
The distinction between this equilibrium and the one in the previous section is that there is
feedback from learning to the price function. If signals are not received by the investors, they do
not appear in the price. The price coefficient on each factor is determined by the investors’ learning,
and if more investors learn about the terminal value, the weight on a learnable factor (a signal) of
the asset fundamental increases.
4.1 Information Capacity Allocation Between Two Available Sources
Theorem 5. Regardless of the type, every agent is minimizing V ari (θ | p).
Proof. In Appendix B.
Since information capacity allocation is not related to obtaining the actual signals but to the
variance structure each agent will have, their objective function is to minimize the uncertainty of
the future return by building the most efficient system of signals. Kondor (2012) also aruges about
this result that each agent is minimizing the conditional variance upon the signals.
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Theorem 6. Regardless of the type B agent’s information capacity allocation, type A agent will
place all of his capacity on future return θ.
Proof. Type A agent is the most sophisticated agent in this market. Given the price p, the only
variable that affects his utility is θ, and he can possess the most exact signal on θ by allocating
all of his capacity KA on θ, making ΣAθ as small as possible to obtain the finest signal θA. Since
there is a continuum of agents in the market, his choice does not affect the market. So there is no
feedback effect from his own decision making.
Theorem 7. Agent chooses to allocate all his capacity on either future return(θ) or aggregate
supply(x), which determines his investment (learning) type endogenously.
Proof. In Appendix B.
This determines the learning of type B agents endogenously to become either a fundamentalist
or a chartist. Fundamentalist is defined as one concentrating on fundamental value of the asset.
The others with fully focusing on the aggregate endowment is defined as a chartist in this paper.
The justification of the name “chartist” comes from the fact that the aggregate demand follows
AR(1) process in the multi-time setting so that he learns about the positive feedback from the past
aggregate demand shock.
Furthermore, this defines the price depending on three signals, one of θ for type A agents, θA,
and the others for type B agents, θB, and xB. Price p is determined as a linear combination of
signals, p = p1θA + p
2θB + p
3xB + p
4x. These coefficients p1, p2, p3 and p4 are determined by
the parameters of the economy and endogenous learning of agents on each information channel.
In this sense, p1, p2, p3 and p4 perfectly summarizes the equilibrium. The exact definition of an
equilibrium will be stated in the next chapter.
4.2 Equilibrium
Equilibrium in this model, similar with Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), comes with the equi-
librium price distribution for given the portion of sophisticated investors λ, and the portion of
fundamentalists in less sophisticated investors, λθ. Since sophisticated agents have better informa-
tion than the uninformed, they have higher utility values than less informed ones. However, type B
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agents have the same utility value if a part of them choose to focus on different channels(0 < λθ < 1).
Since a type B agent realizes the economy in a different way, the allocation problem between θ
and x is upon his realization, as follows:
(ΣBθ, ΣBx) = argmax (UB (W1))
subject to WB1 = DB (θ − p) + xBp+WB0
λDA + (1− λ)DB = x













solutions), then type B agents choose to be one with more expected utility. When there is no pure
equilibrium (type B agents are better off when they do not follow the others’ decision), there exists a
unique ratio λθ such that 0 < λθ < 1 with which expected utilities of fundamentalists and chartists
are same. With this λθ, and given p as a linear function of θA, θB, xB (the signal for type B
investors about the aggregate demand x), and x, (λθ, p) defines the equilibrium as in the definition
below.
Definition 8. Equilibrium is defined as a pair(λθ, p) such that with λθ portion of type A agents
and the price function which is linear to the signals and fundamentals that are multi-variate normal,
the expected utility of the type B agents who concentrate all their capacity on θ is equal to those
focusing on x if 0 < λθ < 1. If λθ = 1, every type B agent is allocating all his capacity on analyzing
θ, and if λθ = 0, every type B agent concentrates on analyzing x.
Theorem 9. There exists an unique overall equilibrium
(
λ∗θ, p




Proof. In Appendix B.
4.3 Summary Statistics
There are several parameters with economic interpretation in this model. Σθ is the level of
uncertainty on the future return. Σx is the variance of aggregate endowment that affects the
demand of a risky asset. λ is a ratio of sophisticated agents(type A) such as financial institutions,
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and a is a risk aversion of investors.KA and KB also changes the equilibrium since KA represents
the exactness of most valuable information in the economy, and KB affects the effectiveness of type
B agents’ information and also his decision to be a fundamentalist or chartist. In equilibrium with
1-time 1-asset model, a2, Σθ, and Σx summarize all the uncertainty of the economy and affect the
equilibrium in the same direction. The parameter RI = a2ΣθΣx aggregate this effect.
From the equilibrium, I will observe several statistics that describe the equilibrium price.
V ar (p) is the variance of the price, and V ar (θ − p) is the inverse information efficiency, which
measures how the price signals about the fundamental well. λθ is a ratio of fundamentalist among
less sophisticated agents (type B), who learns θ with his all capacity, and 1− λθ of type B agents
are focusing on x. To measure under-learning of the fundanmental that is reflected in the price,
I will report 1 − p1 − p2 as under-reflection of the fundamental on the price. When there is no
limit in capacity and asymmetric information structure, p = θ from no-arbitrage condition. So
1− p1− p2 represents how much of the fundamental is not reflected in the price by learning due to
the limited capacity and asymmetric information. Because of the limited capacity and asymmetric
information, p1 + p2 < 1, and when θ is changed, 1− p1 − p2 of the change will not be reflected in
the price.
4.4 Equilibrium with Ratio of Sophisticated Agents, Uncertainty of Economy,
and Risk Aversion
The equilibrium with the portion of sophisticated investors λ and economic uncertainty pa-
rameter RI = a2ΣθΣx is summarized in Figure 3. The ratio of type A agents, λ, increases as it
goes leftward; the junction between ’Ratio of Type A’ axis and RI (Unvertainty) is the start point.
RI goes up as it goes rightward. As the ratio of type A agents increases, type B agents learn
more about x, and therefore they learn more from the price, since higher λ allows a more valuable
signal in the price. For uncertainty of the economy (RI), investors focus on the fundamental as it
increases since this uncertainty is related to the efficiency of price channel to type B agents. The
range of RI is from exp (−5) to exp (5), log-scaled. The range of λ (ratio of type A) is from 0% to
99%.
The efficiency of price channel can be measured by V ar (θ − p), which is reported above as
inverse information efficiency. This increases as λ decreases when λ and RI is low, suggesting that
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Figure 3. Summary Statistics for the change of λ and RI = a2ΣθΣx, with KA = 5, KB = 3
price is more accurate signal that reflects θ, true outcome of the risky asset as there are more
sophisticated agents who have superior information. This result is similar with the variance of the
price V ar (p). It decreases as the ratio of type A agents increases.
Under-reflection of the fundamental decreases as there are more sophisticated agents, or as there
are less uncertainties in the market (RI = a2ΣθΣx). Uncertainties in the market deteriorates the
efficiency of the price channel that conveys valuable information that type A agents have. This
reduces p1 more than that p2might increase from the increase of fundamentalists among type B
agents.
There are more fundamentalists as λ decreases or RI increases. Higher λ calls a larger portion
of demand from more exact signal θA, which makes the price channel more valuable. Higher RI
means there are a lot of noises from the endowment which is not related to θ, or higher variance
of θ lowers the demand and makes the noise look relatively larger. Either effect worsens learning
from the price, and type B agents tend to choose to focus on θ.
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4.5 Information Efficiency of Price and Agents’ Capacity
Figure 4 represents the equilibrium and summary statistics depending on the information ca-
pacity of less sophisticated investors KB, and their relative difference in capacity from sophisticated
investors, KAKB . Figure 5 show the result on KA and KB, which have a slightly different interpreta-
tion. In Figure 4, when KAKB is constant while KB increases, KA also increases. Therefore, Increasing
KB in the model does not allow type B agents to be closer to type A agents, but it raises the overall
capacity of the economy. In Figure 4, the range of KB is from 2 to 4, and
KA
KB
is from 1 to e3,
log-scaled.
Figure 4. Summary Statistics for the change of KAKB and KB, with λ = 0.1, a = 1 and Σθ = Σx = 1
Information efficiency increases as either KB or
KA
KB
becomes larger. The variance of price
increases as either KB or
KA
KB
increases, except the case KA and KB are close. When agents
have similar capacities, increasing in KB stabilizes the price from more exact signals obtained.
However, above some limit, variance of the price increases since as the technology increases, people
can learn more efficiently and the price captures the uncertainty in asset payoff better. Also,
higher information capacity is not always related to the increased welfare since agents trade more
aggressively and exploit from other types of investors due to increased knowledge of θ. This will
be summarized in chapter 4.6.
Either KAKB or KB increases, type B agents tend to learn x more. Because of the convexity of
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the price channel efficiency on capacity KB(non-linearity), this channel is more beneficial as KB
increases. Also, higher KAKB means more valuable information from type A agents’ demand in the
market clearing condition, and also enhances the efficiency of the information channel through the
price.
Figure 5. Summary Statistics for the change of KA and KB, with λ = 0.1, a = 1 and Σθ = Σx = 1
In Figure 5, I have different interpretation on information capacity. First, the information
channel through price is more efficient with higher KA since θA reflected in the market clearing
condition is more precise. However, the variance of the price has a different dynamics depending
on KB is close to or far below from KA. When KB is low, increasing KA stabilizes the price up to
some level, and then raises the variance above that level. When KB is close to KA, increasing KA
raises the variance of the price, mostly because more type B agents learn about x and uncertainty
coming from θ which is not reflected in the price increases. Under-reflection of fundamental in the
price decreases with both greater KA and greater KB.
The information capacities, KA and KB, have a mixed effect to their learning. As in Figure 4
and Figure 5, when they are close enough, type B agents focus on θ since it is more efficient for
them to learn directly about the fundamental as they become smarter. When the gap between two
agents’ abilities is larger, market price becomes more valuable channel to exploit useful information
from sophisticated agents’ movement in the market. However, when KB is much lower than KA,
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they cannot even digest the price movement to incorporate the reflection of sophisticated agents’
demand in the market, and they are going back to the basic: more fundamentalists again. This
causes the efficiency from information channel through price to be convex, and therefore the portion
of fundamentalists is not always a monotone function of KB. As KA increases, learning from price
(learning x) is more efficient.
4.6 Utility
Utility function, from Appendix B, is same as −
√
V arj(θ|p)
V ar(θ−p) for agent j when his endowment is
zero. V ar (θ − p) measures the inverse information efficiency of the price. Therefore, as information
efficiency of the price is larger ( 1V ar(θ−p) is larger), utility is higher. This can be explained by that
as there are more gap between the future outcome and the price and if his exposure to the asset is
zero, there are more chances that agents can benefit.
When agent j’s endowment is xj , then his utility value is
−
√
V arj (θ | p)

















Ex-ante utility of agent j before realizing endowment shock is as follows:
−
√√√√ V arj (θ | p, xj)
a2V ar (xj)
(




+ (1− a2V ar (xj) Σθ)V ar (θ − p | xj)




) increases, agent j’s utility decreases.





increases, the denumerator decreases and may have a negative value. High endow-





the model to have a feasible solution. Also, the sign of





θ − p | xj
)
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in the denominator, is not always negative: when Σθ is very
small, then this can be positive, meaning that holding the risky asset more or less from endowment
shock may benefit the investor.











θ − p | xj
)
means when the agent’s endowment shock






), agents benefit from V ar
(
θ − p | xj
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, the price gap from the
fundamental.












, is more complicated. This
term, which can also be written as
((






, represents the uncertainty
of the economy from the mixed effect of price gap and endowment shock. As this increases, ineffi-
ciency of the economy that each agent can exploit increases. This term represents other investors’
risk sharing motive.
Figure 6. Utilities for the change of parameters, parameters that are not changed in the graph
are: a = 1, KA = 5, KB = 3, Σx = 0.1, λ = 0.1, Σθ = 1.
One result that simplifies the equilibrium is that utility does not change over a, Σθ, or Σx
separately, if I keep
V ar(xj)
Σx
constant. p3 + p4 is proportional to a since each agent’s optimal
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learning decision, and utility.
Figure 6 summarizes the utility that each type obtains, depending on various parameter changes.
For the first two graphs, KA ranges from 4 to 4e
4 and KB from 1 to 4. For the next two graphs,
KA
KB
ranges from 1 to e4, and KB from 1 to 4. For the last row, λ ranges from 1% to 99%, and RI (here,
noted as V ar(θ) since they are equivalent) ranges from e−5 to e5. The utility values are reported
with the case when an investor realizes zero endowment, to highlight the relationship between the



























































Figure 7. Utility and Learning Decision on KB
Sophisticated agents’ utility increases as the their portion in the economy (λ) increases to the
small amount (up to 3% in the Figure 6), and then decreases with the larger λ. With small λ,
the economy needs more λ to have more valuable signals in the demand, but as λ increases, there
are more competitions in the market. This is same for type B agents since they are exploited by
sophisticated agents in the market. As the uncertainty in the future payoff (Σθ) increases, both of
them obtain less utility, because of higher uncertainty in payoffs.
Increasing everyone’s capacity(increasing KB, keeping
KA
KB
constant) has a mixed effect; 1) it
improves the overall capacity of the economy, and allow them to obtain more exact signals, and
2) it allows investors to participate market more aggresively, with their demand proportional to
1
V arj(θ|p) . Observed in the second row of Figure 6, increasing KB first decreases type B agents’
utility while type B agents keep learning the fundamental θ, and increases utility when some of
type B agents become chartist and allow the price to reflect the aggregate demand shock. This
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change in learning over different KB is more evident in Figure 7, which shows the utility values
of fundamentalists and chartists when 100% of type B investors are in each type. However, above
some level of KB, their utility decreases again. This can be explained by less risk sharing and more

























































































Figure 8. Utility and Information Capacity of Sophisticated Investors
This worse-off effect of increased capacity also comes out when KA increases above some level,
keeping KB constant. Type B agents’ utility decreases as KA increases in Figure 8. Furthermore,
when KA is above some level, even type A agents’ utility decreases as KA goes up. If I define the
social welfare as λUA + (1− λ)UB, weighted sum of utilities, then it is decreasing if sophisticated
agents have too much exact information. To maximize socal welfare, sophisticated investors’ access
of information needs to be limited to avoid worse-off effect from their aggressive, competitive trades
in the market.
5 Conclusion
In the Section III, I generalized the model in Grossman and Stiglitz(1980) to allow bounded
rationality of investors and their learning decision before the trading. I set two available information
channels that investors can exploit: fundamental channel and price (aggregate supply) channel.
Investors decide to allocate their information capacity first, and in the equilibrium the learning
decision of investors is jointly determined with the equilibrium price that clears the market.
67
The main result of this paper is as follows. First, I show how investors’ heterogeneous learning
and specialization in learning appear in the equilibrium. My model endogenizes the learning type
as fundamentalists or chartists, and show how investors trade off their learning on different factors.
The convexity in Sims’ constraint makes investors specialization in their learning. The co-existence
of investors who learn different factors can be explained by information substitutibility that in-
vestors want to learn what others do not learn, and the portion for each learning type is balanced
in an equilibrium.
Equilibrium shows relationship between various economic characteristics and market statistics.
As the market becomes more uncertain, the ratio of fundamentalist who learns about asset pay-
off increases, and vice versa. As the information capacity of investors increases, the information
efficiency of the price increases. Also, as the information capacity of both sophisticated and un-
sophisticated investors increase, unsophisticated investors tend to be chartists who analyze the
demand in the price to extract more valuable information in the price.
The price volatility does not always have monotonic relationship with the information capacity
of investors since learning increases the price volatility to reflect the asset payoff volatility, while
learning decreases the price volatility to stabilize the price volatility from aggregate demand. Also,
from information capacity, social welfare is not monotone. When information capacity increases,
social welfare first increases from more efficient equilibrium price, and then decreases due to less risk
sharing motive among investors than exploitation from unsophisticated investors can be observed.
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Appendices
A Fund Type Categorization
In Appendix A, I provide the information in a fund style code (A.1) and keywords in a fund name
(A.2) that I use to categorize mutual funds into domestic equity funds, hybrid funds, international
funds. In Section 3, international funds are categorized in the same category.
A.1 Fund Style Codes
A.1.1 CRSP Style Code
Category CRSP(crsp obj cd)
Domestic Equity ED-, M, MT
Domestic Hybrid I-, MCV, O, OM
International EFS-, EFC-, EFY-, EFIF, EFGL, EFR-, MC, OC
A.1.2 Wiesenburger Objective Code
Category Wiesenburger(fwbrger obj cd)
Domestic Equity
G, I, S, AAL, BAL, ENR, FIN, GCI, HLT, IEQ, LTG, MCG, OTH, SCG,
TCH, UTL
Domestic Non-equity




A.1.3 Lipper Objective Code
Category Lipper(lipper obj cd)
Domestic Equity(Active)
ABR, B, BT, CA, CG, DL, DSB, EI, EIEI, ELCC, FS, FX, G, GI, H,
I, LCCE, LCGE, LCVE, LSE, MC, MCCE, MCGE, MCVE, MLCE,
MLGE, MLVE, MR, MTAC, MTAG, MTAM, NR, RE, S, SCCE,
SCGE, SCVE, SESE, SG, TK, TL, UT
Domestic Equity (Passive)
MATA, MATB, MATC, MATD, MATE, MATF, MATG, MATH,
MATI, SP, SPSP
Domestic Non-equity
A, AL, ARM, AU, AZ, BBB, CAG, CAI, CAM, CAS, CAT, CMA,
CME, CMG, CMM, CMP, CMS, CO, CRX, CT, CTM, CV, FL, FLI,
FLX, GA, GB, GM, GNM, GUS, GUT, HI, HM, HY, IID, IMD,
IMM, ITE, ITM, IUG, IUS, IUT, KS, KY, LA, LP, MA, MAM, MAT,
MD, MDI, MFF, MI, MIM, MM, MN, MD, NC, NJ, NJM, NY, NYI,
NYM, NYT, OH, OHM, OHY, OR, OSS, OST, OTH, OTM, PA,
PAM, PAT, SC, SFI, SID, SII, SIM, SIU, SMD, SSIM, STB, SUS,
SUT, TEM, TM, TN, TX, USM, USO, USS, UST, VA, VAT, WA
International
BM, CMD, CS, GEI, GFS, GH, GLCC, GLCG, GLCV, GMLC,
GMLG, GMLV, GNR, GRE, GS, GSMC, GSME, GSMG, GSMV,
GTK, GX, ID, MSI, XJ, CH, CN, DM, EM, EMD, EML, EMN,
EU, IEI, IF, ILCC, ILCG, ILCV, IMLC, IMLG, IMLV, INI,
INR, IRE, IS, ISMC, ISMG, ISMV, JA, LT, PC, GLI, SWM
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A.1.4 Strategic Insights Objective Code
Category Strategic Insights(si obj cd)
Domestic Equity
AGG, BAL, CPF, ENV, EPR, FIN, FLX, GLD, GRI, GRO, HLT, NTR,
RLE, SCG, SEC, TEC, UTI
Domestic Hybrid
CGN, CHQ, CHY,CIM, CMQ, CPF, CPR, CPR, CSI, CSM, CVR, GGN,
GIM, GSM, OPI, SCU,
Codes starting with I, L, M, SB, SI, SP, or T(except TE)
International
BGA, EGG, EGS, EGT, EGX, EIG, EIS, EIT, EPC, EPX, FLG, GLE,
GMA, GMB, GMC, PAC
BGE, ECH, ECN, EID, EIP, ELT, ERP, ESC, JPN
BGC, BGG, BGN, BGS, GBG, GBS
A.2 Key Words in Fund names
Category Keywords
Index index (not plus or enhanced)
Domestic Non-equity bond, option, hybrid, income
International
name of countries (china, korea, russia, india (not indiana), brazil, etc.)
name of regions ( latin, asia, africa, europe, pacific, etc.)
pacific, emerg, developing market, global, international, intl
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B Proof of Theorems in Section III
B.1 Lemma
B.1.1 Posterior Update of Information via Signals
When there is a signal θε about a random variable θ, with following:
Prior: θ ∼ N (0, Σθ)
Signal: θε ∼ θ + ε, ε ∼ N (0, Σε)
Then the posterior update of information on θ via signal θε is, by Bayes theorem,
p (θ | θε) = p(θ, θε)p(θε) = p (θε | θ) ·
p(θ)
p(θε)
∼ p (θε | θ) p (θ).


























































In case there are two signals θ1 and θ2 from ordered learning – θ2 has an error term added to
θ1,
Prior: θ ∼ N (0, Σθ)
Signal: θ1 ∼ θ + ε1, ε1 ∼ N (0, Σ1)
Signal 2: θ2 ∼ θ + ε1 + ε2, ε2 ∼ N (0, Σ2 − Σ1), when Σ2 > Σ1
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Σθ Σθ + Σ1 Σθ + Σ1

























 · ( Σθ Σθ + Σ1 )
=
 Σθ Σθ
















B.1.2 Expectation of Log-multinormal Distributed Random Variable
Let X and Y be multinormal random variables. First, let’s suppose X ⊥ Y and X ˜ N (0, Σx),






−a (bX + cY )2
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B.2 Utility Function and the Equivalent Objective Function of Agents
Assuming the price as a linear function of signals(there can be a finite number of signals available
through the information channels),


















θ | p, xj
]
− p
aV arj (θ | p)
)
(θ − p) + xj · p
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V ar (X1) = V ar
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θ | p, xj
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+ 2Covj (θ − Ej [θ | p̃] , p̃)
= V ar
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X1, p | xj
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V ar (X1 | xj)
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− (Ej [θ | p]− p)
2





















































































, Σ1 = V ar (X1),




, and Σj = V arj (θ | p).
−(Ej [θ | p]− p)
2
2V arj (θ | p)









)2 − axjY2 −−−− (1)
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Σθ − V ar
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θ − p | xj
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V arj (θ | p, xj)










)2) ·√V arj (θ | p, xj)
V ar (θ − p | xj)
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V ar (X1)V ar (θ − p | xj)
∴ (2) is not affected by investor j’s individual choice.
Therefore,











V arj (θ | p, xj)
V ar (θ − p | xj)




B.3 Information Choice Set for Type B Agents and Equilibrium
B.3.1 Idiosyncratic Learning
Equilibrium price p has a form p = bθ + cx with coefficient b and c in this case. For type B
agent i with information capacity Ki (Ki = KA or KB), let’s assume that he allocates his capacity
as ΣBθ =
Σθ
α (α < Kj). Then












To minimize this, α = 1 if b2Σθ > c
2Σx, and α = Kj if b
2Σθ < c
2Σx. This means that capacity
allocation will be always at the end, in equilibrium with Σθ and Σx being not extreme, b
2Σθ = c
2Σx.
This means that the learning will be always a cornered solution – investors fully learn from θ or x.
Now let’s solve for λAθ and λBθ.





) = ΣθKA+1 , V arB (θ | p) = ΣθKB+1 .


















































































EBx [θ | p] =
KB
b (1 +KB)






Market clearing condition gives us:
(λλAθ (KA − 1) + (1− λ)λBθ (KB − 1)) θ
+
(
λλAθ + (1− λ)λBθ + λ (1− λAθ)KA + (1− λ) (1− λBθ)KB
b














− (λλAθ (KA − 1) + (1− λ)λBθ (KB − 1))
λλAθ+(1−λ)λBθ+λ(1−λAθ)KA+(1−λ)(1−λBθ)KB
b − λ (KA + 1)− (1− λ) (KB + 1)
=
λKA + (1− λ)KB
λ (KA + 1) + (1− λ) (KB + 1)
b = λKA+(1−λ)KBλ(KA+1)+(1−λ)(KB+1) means that price is always under-reflecting a true outcome of the risky
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asset with some noise from the endowment shock. As λ goes up, or either KA or KB increases,
b goes up and the price reflects the fundamental more exactly. The coefficient c on x will also
determine how efficient the price is, and how much of the fundamental θ can be revealed from the
price.
Again, the market clearing condition is:
(λλAθ (KA − 1) + (1− λ)λBθ (KB − 1)) θ
+
(
λλAθ + (1− λ)λBθ + λ (1− λAθ)KA + (1− λ) (1− λBθ)KB
b



















b − λ (KA + 1)− (1− λ) (KB + 1)
=
c+ c (λ (1− λAθ) (KA − 1) + (1− λ) (1− λBθ) (KB − 1)) + abΣθ
λλAθ + (1− λ)λBθ + λ (1− λAθ)KA + (1− λ) (1− λBθ)KB − λKA − (1− λ)KB
= − abΣθ
λKA + (1− λ)KB
Since b and c are constant, learning does not have a feedback to the price.
B.3.2 Capacity Choice of Agents Who Are Most Focusing on θ Among Type B Agents







Let’s say ri =
V ar(x)
V ar(xj)
(ratio of aggregate endowment shock to the idiosyncratic one). Since type A
can receive the most exact signal in this economy, they always allocate their capacity on θ.
Now, let’s assume that price is a linear function of all signals agents obtain. There exist a
group of type B agents who allocate more information capacity on θ than other type B agents. Let
their signal on θ be θmaxB . Because of ordered learning in θ, other type B agents’ signal is the sum







Now, let’s call these type B agents who receive θmaxB as Type B1 agent. Also, let’s name an
atomic agent as agent j, who minimizes his objective function V arj (θ | p). For the agents who focus
on θ the most except ones with the signal θmaxB , they know others’ signals on θ, and
´
p5 (i) θiBdi










V ar (θmaxB ) =
(1+α1(KA−1))Σθ
α1(KA−1) (In the capacity allocation constraint, agent j allocates αj on θ, and
type B1 agents uses α1 on θ, 0 ≤ αj ≤ α1 ≤ KB−1KA−1 ).
From β1 =
1























































































Then a type B1 agent’s objective function is





































ˆ  1βkKB (R3k)2(
KB − 1βk
)2 + 2R3k 1βk(
KB − 1βk







βl < βk =⇒ αl > αk:
∣∣p3k∣∣ > ∣∣p3l ∣∣. Since I have β1 < βk,
























β1 − (β1KA − 1)2












β1KA − 1 +KB (D1 −D2β1) ·RI +RI
KA (β1KA − 1) + 1β1 (KB (D1 −D2β1) ·RI +RI)
)
= f (β1)
f ′ (β1) ∝ −(−1 + β1KA)2(1 +D1KB) + (1 +D1KB −D2β1KB)2RI
D1 − D2β1 is negative for all β1, since p3k · xkB terms are always used for agents to pre-act
the aggregate demand shock p4x. However, D1 +
1
KB




4x | B′1s information
)
should decrease. Furthermore, from market clearing condi-
tion,







































since R3l > −
KB− 1βl
KB
λl (λl is a portion of type B agents
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D2 =
ˆ  1βkKB (R3k)2(
KB − 1βk















































ˆ  1βkKB (R3k)2(
KB − 1βk
)2
 dk − 2 ˆ R3l 1KB − 1βl dl




This means that D1 ≤ 0, too.





BRI −K2A (1 +D1KB)
)
β21 + (2KA (1 +D1KB)− 2D2KB (1 +D1KB)RI)β1
+ (1 +D1KB)
2RI − (1 +D1KB)







B +D1KB(6− 3D2KBβ1)− 3D2β1KB +D22K2Bβ21)))RI
When D22K
2
BRI −K2A (1 +D1KB) > 0,
















A(6− 3D2KBβ1)− 3D2KBβ21K2A +D22K2Bβ31K2A)
< −(D2KB(1 +D1KB)− 2KA(1 +D1KB)2 − 3D1D2K2Bβ21K2A − 3D2KBβ21K2A)
< − (1 +D1KB)
(






BRI −K2A (1 +D1KB) < 0, The maximum of f ′ (β1) is at
β∗1 =
KA (1 +D1KB)−D2KB (1 +D1KB)RI
K2A (1 +D1KB)−D22K2BRI
if this is in β1’s range. For this peak point to be in the range of β1 ≥ 1KB ,
1
KB











f ′ (β∗1) = (1 +D1KB)
2
(











= −(−1 + KA
KB
)2(1 +D1KB) + (1 +D1KB −D2)2RI









Since the coefficient for the second-order term is negative and the starting point has a positive
function value, the only possible minimum points are two endpoints. If there is no peak point in
β1’s range, still, the maximum point of f is at the end point since now f
′ is a decreasing function
in β1’s range, which makes f concave function.
B.3.3 Capacity Choice of Agents Who Are Second Most Focusing on θ Among Type
B Agents
Now let’s assume that there are such type B agents allocating some capacity on θ. This means
that focusing fully on θ is one of the optimal solutions. Let’s look into other type B agents who
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(
(αj − αl) (KA − 1)
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(C1 + C2) Σθ + CxΣx

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C (βj) + xB (βj)

















− C (βj) + xB (βj)



































(A (βj) +B (βj))
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≥ 0. Here, the problem is βj with





. This can be determined from the numerator. The second
derivative of the numerator is,
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h′′ (βj) = −2
(1 +D1KB) (KA +KB (−1 + (1 +D1KB −D2)RI))RI
β3j (KA − 1)
4KB
Since 1+D1KB and 1+D1KB−D2 are positive, h′′ (βj) < 0. Therefore, the only possible point
















This concludes that agents always have end-point capacity allocation – they choose one information
source to allocate all of their capacity on.
B.3.4 Equilibrium with Two Groups of Type B Agents with End-Point Allocation,
with Learning Order on Both Signals
Now let’s assume that λθ is the portion of type B agents who concentrates his full capacity
on θ. Then (1 − λθ) of type B agents are focusing on x. I call the first group as type C agents,
and the second group as type D agents. Then what would be the market clearing condition? Let’s
denote the signal that type 3 agents obtain to be θB, and that for type 4 agents to be xB. Let




= Σx + νBx. From that the capacity constraint is binding, we can











EA [θ | p]− p





EC [θ | p]− p
aV arC (θ | p)
− x
)
+ (1− λ) (1− λθ)
(
ED [θ | p]− p







θ1 + (1− λ)λθγCEC [θ | p] + (1− λ) (1− λθ) γDED [θ | p]− x
λγA + (1− λ)λθγC + (1− λ) (1− λθ) γD
Let ECj [θ | p] = δθθB + δCxj + δ1p, ED [θ | p] = δxxB + δDxj + δ2p, and γi = (aV ari (θ | p))−1







θA + (1− λ)λθγC (δθθB + δCx) + (1− λ) (1− λθ) γD (δxxB + δDx)− x
λγA + (1− λ) (1− δ1)λθγC + (1− λ) (1− δ2) (1− λθ) γD
p5 = − (λγA + (1− λ) (1− δ1)λθγC + (1− λ) (1− δ2) (1− λθ) γD)−1





p2 = − (1− λ)λθγCδθp5
p3 = − (1− λ) (1− λθ) γDδxp5




I will use the similar process as above to calculate (p1, p2, p3, p4).

























Cov (p̃C , θ) = Cov (p, θ)−
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p1 + p2 −
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p2 = − (1− λ)λθγCδθp5
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Then p2 and p3 have to satisfy three equations as follows:
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p3 = (1− λ) (1− λθ) γD
(
p3 +




= (1− λ) (1− λθ)
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p3 +



























2)2 ΣθKB−1 + (p
4)2 ΣxKB − (p



























































1 + 1−λλ λθ
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λ (1 +R2) (1− λθ)

















. These values will be used later for continuity check (whether everything




































































p4 = − (λγA + (1− λ) (1− δ1)λθγC + (1− λ) (1− δ2) (1− λθ) γD)−1
Let’s say δ1 =
C1
p1







































1 + 1−λλ (1− δ1)λθ
γC
γA





















1 + 1−λλ λθ
γC
γA

















+ 1−λλ C2 (1− λθ)
γD
γA
1 + 1−λλ λθ
γC
γA
+ 1−λλ (1− λθ)
γD
γA
Substituting p1 gives us δ1 and δ2.
Now we have R2 = R2 (R3) , and R3 = R3 (R2) for other parameters given. Now we can solve
fixed-point problem and get R2 and R3 as a function of λθ. Now we need to solve λθ to equalize
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the two utilities UC and UD.
B.3.4.1 Ex-ante Utility













)2]√V arj (θ | p, xj)











V arj (θ | p, xj)
V ar (θ − p | xj)




by assuming that the prior of x to the
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θ, p | xj
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V ar (θ − p | xj)
)
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U j = −
√
V arj (θ | p, xj)
V ar (θ − p | xj) + (Ψ1 −Ψ2)V ar (xj)
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B.3.4.2 Upper Bound of Future Return, or Endowment












< 0, utility value is −∞. This is the case when











B.3.4.3 How to obtain this mixed equilibrium










































KA−1 + (1 +R2)
1−λ
λ (1− λθ)
α (R3) = f (R2 (R3))R3 + g (R2 (R3)) = 0

















Then, with ρ (R3) = KB (1 +R3)
2 − 2R3 − 1 and S = R3 (KB − 1 +KBR3)KBρ (R3),
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S = R3 (KB − 1 +KBR3)KBρ (R3)
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1− λ
λ































































(1− λθ) (KB − 1)KB
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∴ α′ (R3) > 0
Since α (R3) is a increasing function of R3, R2 and R3 are unique with other parameters given.
Then I can calculate γC and γD above, and choose λθ that makes V arC (θ | p) and V arD (θ | p)

































2)2 KBKB−1Σθ + (p
4)2 ΣxKB
−1



























































































































































As λθ increases, R2 increases and R3 increases (|R3| decreases). This means that as λθ increases,




+ 2 (1 +R3)KB = 2R3
K2B
KB − 1

















KA−1 + (1 +R2)
1−λ
λ (1− λθ)
> −KB − 1
KB
Now I will show that RHS is increasing on R3.
KB (1 +R3) (−2 +KB +KBR3) = KB
(






















−1 + 1− λ
λ




−1− 2R3 +KB (1 +R3)2
)
RI > 0
Therefore, the solution is unique.
∴RHS is an increasing function on R2, and the problem is solved. λθ that satisfies the equation
UC (λθ) = UD (λθ) is unique.
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